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Imprisoned by History

For two neighboring civilizations as old as China and India, there is remarkably little historical evidence of political interaction between them.[1] There is ample proof of continuous overland trade and exchange of ideas through the centuries, but this appears to have occurred despite political cooperation and confrontation.[2] Thus, while Buddhism spread from the plains of northern India to the hinterland of Tibet and China, it was not proselytized through the power of the sword but by traveling missionaries armed with only *bhikshu* (begging) bowls. Similarly, the famous Silk Road, a branch of which extended into the plains of northern India from Taxila (in present-day Pakistan), remained more or less operational throughout the political upheavals in China and India until the arrival of the European traders, who either attempted to control it or exploited alternative sea routes.

There are several reasons behind this historical experience. First, apart from a few notable exceptions, China and India were primarily self-sufficient societies preoccupied with their own internal dynamics. By and large they were not dependent on external trade for their existence. Second, geography—particularly the natural barrier imposed by the mighty ranges of the Himalayas—prevented easy mass movement and confined the interaction to a few traders, adventurers, and explorers.[3] With some exceptions, almost all of the interaction was through the primarily nomadic tribes of the Tibetan plateau or along the trading centers and routes of Central Asia, notably Taxila and Bactria (in present-day Afghanistan). Only the advent of aviation and the opening of sea routes surmounted the

almost impregnable Himalayan wall. Third, the epicenters of the two civilizations—China's, which lies east of today's Great Wall, and India's, which was primarily centered in the Indo-Gangetic plain—were so far removed from each other that they did not warrant any direct interaction. This, coupled with the land-centric focus, might have also accounted for these civilizations being insular in character. Ironically, it was the colonial experience and the exploitation of the sea routes by European powers that provided China and India with a common political history for the first time.

Although the colonial experience for China and India was very different, both were exploited and subjugated in equal measure. (The former was never really colonized in the classic sense by any single power but was nonetheless dominated by a collection of European and, later, Japanese rulers; the latter was first colonized by the East India Company and then the British monarchy, which together ruled India for nearly 300 years.) Moreover, during the globalization of trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the two civilizations were also pitched against each other for the first time in their history during the Opium Wars (1839–1842); it was Indian opium that the British were determined to forcibly sell in China to pay for tea, which was in great demand in England. Thus, China and India were inevitably compelled to compete with each other under this Western model of globalization.[4] Also during the colonial period, particularly during World War II, China and India were also compelled to cooperate with each other by various Western powers as they sought to prevent Japan's expansion into their traditional colonial territories. This was exemplified by the construction of the Stilwell Burma Road that linked the two countries through a new overland route with the express purpose of challenging the Japanese onslaught.[5] Thus, even though China and India confronted and cooperated with each other under colonialism, it was not based on their own free will.

Postcolonial Tensions, 1947–1962

India became independent on 15 August 1947, after a long though largely nonviolent freedom movement; communist China emerged on 1 October 1949 after an intense and violent internal political upheaval and a civil war. There were great expectations that the two ancient civilizations would forge a formidable partnership in the postcolonial world. And there was a brief honeymoon period from 1949 to 1957, during which the two neighbors established diplomatic relations (on 1 April 1950), exchanged high-level visits (Premier Zhou Enlai visited India in June 1954 and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited China in October of the same year), and shared warm relations; but it did not last.[6] By the late 1950s serious differences had emerged, particularly over the undemarcated border, and by 1962 the two were at war.[7] This war and the unresolved boundary issue continue to dominate their relations even today.

Colonial legacy was primarily responsible for the India-China border dispute. The 1913–1914 Simla meeting attended by representatives from British India, Tibet, and the Republic of China resulted in an agreement that made vague references to watersheds and natural boundaries as the border between British India and Tibet. This was the basis for the McMahon Line.[8] The Chinese representative initialed the document, but the central government in Beijing, under tremendous pressure at home, never formally signed it. And though it was accepted by the government of Tibet, the legitimacy of the McMahon Line was challenged by the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek as well as the communist government of Mao Tse-tung, both of whom had committed themselves to the restoration of China's former historical power and territory. Thus, at the time of its independence India inherited one of the longest, poorly demarcated, and disputed borders with an important neighbor—Tibet and, later, China.[9]

Apart from the border dispute, serious ideological differences were also evident in the early days of postcolonial Sino-Indian relations. Immediately after the success of Mao's communist revolution, India was one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China. New Delhi also sent Sardar K. M. Pannikkar, one of its most able diplomats, as ambassador to Beijing to signal how well disposed India was to communist China. However, reciprocation on the part of Mao was less than forthcoming; Beijing initially referred to the Indian government as a puppet of imperialism and an obstacle to movements for national liberation.[10] It was only when India remained stolidly neutral in the Korean War and vociferously advocated a seat for China in the United Nations (UN), despite strong opposition from the United States, that Beijing relented and

accepted India's anti-imperialist credentials.[11] However, it was the geopolitical conflict between the two emerging Asian giants that dominated their bilateral relations over the next five decades.[12]

Nevertheless, the early 1950s witnessed a growing solidarity between the two newly independent Asian countries, which was summed up in the popular phrase *Hindi, Chini, bhai bhai* (Indians and Chinese are brothers). During this period, marked by euphoria and cordiality, the territorial claims were largely overlooked as the two countries were preoccupied with global and regional issues bearing on their security.[13] China more or less acknowledged India's leadership role in the nonalignment movement, whereas New Delhi supported Beijing's position on Taiwan and made efforts to bring China into the family of Asian-African countries.[14]

However, the old suspicions resurfaced at the 1955 Bandung conference, which was meant to showcase Sino-Indian friendship in the broader context of solidarity among newly emerging Afro-Asian states. As many of China's neighbors were pro-Western in their disposition and looked upon a Communist-led China with deep suspicion, Nehru took it upon himself to assuage their fears and convince them of China's credentials for entry into the new community of nations. Zhou, however, regarded Nehru's actions as patronizing and later expressed his resentment against the overbearing Indian attitude.[15]

In 1950, the PLA of China marched into Lhasa and brought Tibet under China's control. This de facto takeover became de jure when the fifteen-year-old Dalai Lama, the acknowledged Tibetan leader, accepted the seventeen-point agreement of May 1951 with China, which effectively nullified any Tibetan claim to an independent status.[16] For China, the annexation of Tibet was the final stage in the unification of the so-called five races of China. For India, the Himalayan frontier in general and the Tibetan plateau in particular—which had provided a vital buffer zone between China and India since the time of the British Empire—vanished overnight.[17]

Following China's entry into Tibet, Nehru, who had clearly not anticipated Beijing's actions, adopted a two-pronged response. First, he took rapid steps to include Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim into India's defense perimeter and extended Indian administration into Tawang, a monastery town beyond the McMahon Line. Second, Nehru also tried to persuade China to maintain a low-profile relationship with Tibet based on a system of suzerainty, which would guarantee extensive autonomy to Lhasa. However, the Indian negotiators failed to

convince their Chinese counterparts. Realizing that the Chinese occupation of Tibet was a fait accompli and not having the wherewithal to challenge these developments, Nehru eventually acknowledged Tibet as an autonomous region of China under the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954.[18] In many ways the 1954 agreement paved the way for improved relations between the two countries.

However, having backed down over the question of China's suzerainty over Tibet and accepting Beijing's claims over Tibet, New Delhi hoped to use the goodwill generated by Panchsheel to reach a working agreement with communist China over the McMahon Line to ensure that differences over the issue did not affect the overall relationship.[19] This attempt to reduce the prospect of war between India and China was supported by India's army chief, General K. S. Thimayya, who admitted that Nehru was aware of the Chinese threat but realized that there was very little they could do militarily and sought a diplomatic solution.[20] India and China began border talks in 1954, but the attempts failed, and throughout the late 1950s relations with China grew steadily worse.[21]

In 1958, in a letter to Nehru, Chinese premier Zhou proposed that "the two sides temporarily maintain the *status quo*, that is to say, each side keep for the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction and not go beyond them."[22] In other words, even though the Chinese had never recognized the McMahon Line as the legal boundary, they nonetheless regarded this as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) ever since the PLA moved into Tibet.[23] Zhou further elaborated on these issues by pointing out that (1) boundary disputes existed; (2) there was the existence of an LAC exercising administrative jurisdiction on either side; (3) in settling the boundary dispute certain geographical principles like watersheds, river valleys, and mountain passes should be considered; (4) the national feelings of the two peoples should be respected; (5) the two sides should observe the current LAC pending a final resolution; and (6) both sides should refrain from patrolling close to disputed areas to ensure tranquility along the border.[24]

The Sino-Indian War, 1962

Coinciding with deteriorating Sino-Indian relations over the boundary issue in the late 1950s was the simmering Tibetan rebellion

against China, which finally boiled over in late March 1959. Following the failed revolt, the Dalai Lama, disguised as a soldier, escaped from Lhasa and, assured of political asylum by Nehru, reached India on 31 March 1959 to set up a Tibetan government-in-exile in the northern Indian border town of Dharamsala. China accused both India and the United States, particularly the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), of supporting the rebellion, and it was "widely believed that without the CIA's assistance, it was impossible for the Dalai Lama to escape the PLA's pursuit."[25] Although recent evidence suggests that the CIA did indeed have a covert operation in Tibet code-named Shadow Circus and that some of these missions may have been launched from Indian territory, it is not clear to what extent the Indian government itself was also directly involved.[26] The Tibetan revolt and the flight of refugees to India led to further tensions between India and China. According to Liu Xuecheng, "In Chinese eyes, political asylum given to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan rebels and the warm welcome Nehru himself extended to the Dalai Lama at this moment were at least an unfitting reception, if not a provocative act."[27]

These tensions brought into question the status of Tibet and India's adherence to the 1954 agreement and also exacerbated the differences that had emerged during the ongoing boundary negotiations in the late 1950s. It highlighted the question of the historical borders in the Ladakh region of Indian Kashmir and in the North East Frontier Agency of India (now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh), north of Assam and east of Myanmar.[28] During this period China had already occupied the Aksai Chin plateau of Ladakh and built a road through it connecting its Tibetan region with that of Sinkiang (Xinjiang). Similarly, in 1959 India launched Operation Onkar, a plan to establish military posts along the McMahon Line (and in some cases beyond it). This plan was to have been completed by July 1962.[29]

Meanwhile, following armed clashes in Longju (in the eastern sector) and Kongka (in the western sector) in 1959, and in a last-ditch effort to get the border talks back on track, Nehru and Zhou met in New Delhi from 19 to 25 April 1960. However, the deadlock continued, as neither side was willing to budge from its position; the drift toward war continued unabated. With the Indian army pursuing its "forward policy" and pushing northward, and with the PLA units responding tit-for-tat, small skirmishes escalated into open military confrontation. War eventually erupted on 20 October 1962 when Chinese troops forcibly evicted Indian troops from the Dhola post in the eastern sector, which lay beyond the McMahon Line and which the Indian army had established as part of the forward policy under Operation Onkar. Over the next month—until their unilateral withdrawal on 21 November 1962—Chinese troops easily overwhelmed ill-prepared Indian forces in all sectors along the McMahon Line.[30]

In the Ladakh theater, India was barely able to prevent a complete rout, although by mid-November the Chinese army was in possession of all the territory Beijing had previously claimed. In the North East Frontier Agency, the Indian army fared much worse. In the face of a forceful assault by the Chinese, the Indian defense effort collapsed, the morale of the troops was crushed, and the army leadership was disgraced. Here Chinese forces reached within forty miles of Tezpur and 100 miles from the Digboi oil fields. Then, almost inexplicably, on 21 November 1962 the Chinese government announced a unilateral withdrawal to points where it considered the territorial boundaries should be.[31] The Indian government objected vehemently, but there was little it could do except appeal for a withdrawal and a reversion to the status quo ante. Although the war did not change the status quo of the border, for all intents and purposes India had lost the war and was forced to accept both territorial loss and national humiliation on a grand scale.

In December 1962 the prime minister of Ceylon, Srimavo Bandaranaike, convened a six-nation Afro-Asian conference in Colombo to bring China and India back to the negotiating table.[32] This conference produced a series of proposals, which were more or less acceptable to India.[33] However, China, while accepting in principle the Colombo proposals, insisted that India should also withdraw its troops twenty kilometers from the disputed border areas in both the western and eastern sectors. Beijing, worried that the proposed cease-fire line and demilitarized zones might be regarded as de facto boundaries, rejected them as a basis for negotiations.[34] Subsequently, China and India broke off all bilateral relations, and it would be another two decades before they resumed negotiations on the border.

Although the Sino-Indian War was primarily a bilateral affair, which Beijing publicly describes as a limited border war and New Delhi as a national humiliation, it is now clear that the confrontation was not confined only to these two actors; both the United States and the Soviet Union were also involved to some degree during different

periods of the war, and their involvement (or lack of it) had a direct impact on the duration and outcome of the conflict. Although the official Soviet policy on the Sino-Indian boundary dispute was to remain neutral, in practice Moscow was highly critical of Beijing's handling of the crisis. Following the 1959 clashes, the Soviet Union denounced China's approach as "an expression of a narrow nationalist attitude" and tilted in favor of India, arguing that it was unthinkable for a militarily and economically weaker India to launch such a military attack against China.[35] In fact, Nikita Khrushchev went so far as to accuse Mao of stirring up trouble with India because of "some sick fantasy" to drag the Soviet Union into the conflict.[36] During this period Moscow even ignored China's complaints and supplied India with transport planes for use in the Ladakh area in 1960. This Soviet attitude, of course, did not necessarily reflect a pro-India policy but was the direct result of the ideological and political fallout between Moscow and Beijing in the late 1950s. This became evident with the start of the Cuban missile crisis when Moscow toned down its anti-Beijing tirade and instead blamed the "notorious McMahon Line," which had been imposed on China and India.[37] The United States, under the new John F. Kennedy administration, had developed close ties with India, and during the war Washington entered into a formal pact with New Delhi to provide critical logistical support for the war effort: a squadron of C-130 transports made fifteen to seventeen sorties per day between Central India and Leh, carrying vital military supplies to the front.[38] Nehru also requested from both the United States and Britain fifteen bomber squadrons to interdict the advancing Chinese troops.[39] Other senior Indian defense officials also asked the United States to send the Seventh Fleet, led by the USS *Enterprise*, into the Bay of Bengal to prove U.S. support of India and to intimidate China.[40] Neither of these requests was granted, primarily because the White House had become preoccupied with the Cuban missile crisis at the time. Thus, even in the early 1960s a limited war between the two Asian giants had the potential of escalating into a major confrontation that could have engaged the two superpowers as well.

Already burdened with a less than favorable domestic situation, the involvement of the superpowers meant that Beijing—which might otherwise have been inclined to fight a protracted war and resolve the boundary issue once and for all—was compelled to fight a quick battle and force a quick decision. According to Liu, "Chinese policy-makers decided that the operation would be a punishing action and . . . would be implemented within the disputed areas and brought to an end before winter came."[41] This approach worked partly because of the "quick and firm American and British responses to Nehru's urgent appeals and the successful advances of the Chinese armed forces."[42] Barely two years after the war, on 16 October 1964, China successfully tested its first nuclear bomb.[43]

For India the scale of the defeat and the culpability of both the civilian and military institutions cannot be underestimated.[44] From a military standpoint the armed forces proved to be utterly incapable of defending India's territorial integrity. The outward sense of optimism that had characterized defense and foreign policy making at the political level between 1947 and 1962 never returned. Although both the United States and Britain had rallied on the side of India, and even though the Soviet Union abandoned its professed neutrality to publicly criticize Chinese actions, they were unable and, perhaps, unwilling to commit themselves militarily against China.[45] Thus, one of the lessons that India took away from the 1962 war was the need to create an indigenous conventional capability to counter the Chinese threat. The need to buttress this conventional capability with a nuclear riposte was acutely felt following China's nuclear test (this is discussed in the next section).

Perhaps the greatest victim of the war was Nehru. One incident in particular captured the depth of his trauma. Nehru was presiding over a cultural event in Delhi where Lata Mangeshkar, India's most popular woman crooner, sang "*Ai mere watan ke longo*," a song dedicated to those Indians who had died in the conflict with China. As Nehru heard the song, "at the age of 73, a man who had spent more than 10 years in jail for opposing the British Raj, who nursed the nation back to health after the wounds of the partition in 1947 and who worked 16–18 hours a day, seldom complaining of fatigue, broke down in full public gaze."[46] Within a year of this episode, Nehru died.

The Sino-Indian Cold War, 1962–1976

Although the Himalayas absolved the need for either China or India to build a bamboo or iron curtain, Sino-Indian relations during this period had all the trappings of a classic cold war. Despite, or perhaps

because of, India's massive defense effort in the aftermath of the 1962 war, relations did not deteriorate further and the threat of a second Sino-Indian war slowly receded; however, the process of normalization also stood still. For instance, even though both sides now accepted the cease-fire line of 21 November 1962 as the LAC, neither side made any effort to formally demarcate this line.[47] This was partly due to a growing conventional parity, and partly to the development of separate regional agendas.

Soon after the 1962 war a tense military buildup and confrontation developed. The two sides deployed more than 400,000 troops along the desolate mountainous terrain, with eleven mountain divisions on the Indian side against eight Chinese infantry divisions. China and India also made improvements in logistics by building roads and airfields.[48] Sino-Indian animosity after the 1962 war soon evolved into a dependent antagonism of global Cold War power politics, with India and the Soviet Union on one side, and China and Pakistan (and, later, the United States) on the other. Any attempts to improve relations between New Delhi and Beijing were constrained by the Sino-Soviet antagonism and the Indo-Pakistani confrontation.[49]

In the post-1962 period, three international developments in particular determined the course of Sino-Indian relations, illustrating yet again that relations between Beijing and New Delhi cannot be examined only in a strictly bilateral context. First, the growing rift between the Soviet Union and China, which began over ideological differences, quickly deteriorated into a state of animosity between the erstwhile communist allies. Moscow charged Beijing with irresponsible radicalism that could result in open military confrontation between the socialist and capitalist camps, whereas Beijing accused Moscow of betraying the revolutionary principles in search of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist United States. The Soviet Union soon began canceling its assistance projects in China and demanded that Beijing repay its debts owed even as China entered a period of economic downturn made worse by three years of natural disasters. The dispute escalated in the late 1960s and culminated in a shooting war in 1969 on the banks of the Ussuri River—the first hot war between two nuclear-armed states. A communist cold war ensued afterward, and it was not until the mid-1980s that the two countries normalized their relations.[50]

Second, the Sino-Soviet rift coincided with not only the evolving

Indo-Soviet partnership, which was embodied in the Friendship Treaty signed between the two in 1971, but also with the emerging U.S.-China rapprochement, which resulted in the now famous secret visit by President Richard Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, to Beijing in 1971.[51] Third, the Sino-Pakistan relationship, which had not been significant until 1960, began to rapidly develop into a strategic and anti-India axis even as New Delhi's relations with both Beijing and Islamabad deteriorated.[52]

The origins of the entente cordiale between China and Pakistan can be traced back to 1961 when Pakistan for the first time supported the Soviet draft resolution that sought to restore China's membership in the United Nations. This was followed by the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement of 3 March 1963 that defined their common border, which both sides initially agreed had not been formally delimited and demarcated. This bilateral agreement, coming within months of the Sino-Indian War over the border issue, took the form of an anti-India alliance. Subsequently, during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, fought primarily over Kashmir, China sided with Pakistan. During the war Beijing accused India of building military structures in Tibet and issued an ultimatum to New Delhi to dismantle these structures.[53] China also reportedly warned India that it would intervene if New Delhi attacked East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh).[54] After the war and for the next two decades, China became the primary arms supplier for Pakistan.[55]

During the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, which led to the birth of Bangladesh, Sino-Pakistani cooperation was evident at both the diplomatic and military levels. In April, when an Indian-backed guerrilla movement began in East Pakistan, China protested against India and Zhou assured Pakistan's military dictator, General Yahya Khan, that "should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan government and people in their struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence."[56] Significantly, the statement made no reference to the "unity and integrity" of Pakistan. This April statement by Zhou, coupled with the news of Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in July, was the primary factor that prompted India to sign the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty on 9 August 1971.[57] In early November Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former foreign minister and now leader of the Pakistan People's Party (which had a majority in the 1970 elections),

visited Beijing to get military support. Although China did affirm its support to Pakistan in a statement (again, "unity and integrity" were not mentioned), no joint declaration was issued, which indicated that Bhutto had failed to get an explicit Chinese military guarantee.[58] However, Beijing was more than willing to support Islamabad diplomatically. Soon after China took its seat as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in November 1971, one of Beijing's first resolutions, following the Indian military intervention in East Pakistan on 3 December, was to condemn India and call for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces. The Soviet Union vetoed the Chinese resolution and sparked off a so-called veto war: Moscow exercised the veto two more times during the course of the war, whereas China used its veto to block an invitation to an East Pakistan representative to address the Security Council.[59]

On the military front, reports that a naval fleet bearing the Chinese flag would attempt to extricate the trapped Pakistani army in Bangladesh turned out to be unfounded. But it was confirmed that a U.S. naval task force, led by the nuclear-armed USS *Enterprise*, was sailing toward the Bay of Bengal, something that was seen as a direct threat by India. In the wake of the emerging Sino-U.S. rapprochement and Washington's tilt toward Pakistan, New Delhi was worried that a U.S.-Chinese alliance was planning to open up a third front.[60] However, apart from accusing India of infringing on the territory of Tibet along the Sikkim border, and mobilizing some troops locally, China made no military moves for the duration of the war.[61]

Although some strategists have consistently highlighted the Chinese military support to Pakistan, particularly during the 1965 and 1971 wars, by most accounts this support was at best noncommittal. Although a "number of declarations were made from which it could be inferred that China would come to Pakistan's aid, . . . no explicit promise was ever given."[62] Moreover, in both 1965 and 1971, China raised only minor issues of infringement along the "sensitive but well fortified" Sikkim border, whereas there were other areas "more vulnerable to an offensive, had China actually intended to launch one."[63] Besides, there was no clear evidence during either of these incidents that China had embarked on a major military mobilization.

And though China did provide significant conventional military assistance to Pakistan both during and after the 1965 and 1971 wars, these weapon supplies, according to Leo Rose, "merely provided Pakistan with a reasonable deterrent against India's much larger and technologically superior military"; it did not provide Pakistan the military capability to launch military operations against India.[64] As suggested by Yaacov Vertzberger, "China wanted a policy that would demonstrate all-out support for Pakistan without going beyond a certain limit of actual commitment to military involvement—unless it became absolutely necessary."[65] This policy was evident during the height of the Sino-Indian cold war not only in the context of Pakistan but also with regard to India's other neighbors. Following the Sino-Indian rapprochement, even this verbal support was noticeably diluted.

Sino-Indian Détente, 1979–1998

By 1969 India's prime minister (and Nehru's daughter), Indira Gandhi, was prepared to improve relations, but Beijing declined to respond.[66] It was not until 1976 that the two countries again exchanged ambassadors. The Chinese asked the Romanian president, Nicolae Ceauşescu, to relay the message that Beijing wanted to improve relations and was prepared to hold talks on border issues. This probe was reciprocated when the Indian prime minister, Morarji Desai, indicated during his visit to Washington in June 1978 that "India is ready, sometimes in the future, to recognize the present frontier as the Indo-Chinese boundary, and that India would not demand the return of territory seized by China between 1957–1962."[67] These initiatives were taken "despite dire warnings from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin."[68] In a way, the Desai-led Janata government wanted to distance itself from the Soviet Union by seeking improvement of relations with China. The post-Mao Chinese leadership, in turn, had similar interests. One consideration was that Beijing recognized that the Indo-Soviet friendship was closely linked to Indo-Chinese enmity and, therefore, that the improvement of Sino-Indian relations would serve to distance India from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the U.S. military defeat in Vietnam and the reduced U.S. presence in South Asia created a power vacuum. By stabilizing Sino-Indian relations, Beijing hoped to frustrate Soviet attempts to encircle China.[69]

In February 1979 Indian foreign minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. In June 1980 senior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, in

an interview with the editor of an Indian defense journal, offered to settle the long-standing border dispute with India. Echoing the late Chinese premier Zhou's proposal some twenty years earlier, Deng suggested that a resolution of the border issues be based on a mutual recognition of the status quo: India would accept Chinese control of Aksai Chin, and in return China would recognize Indian control over disputed territories in the eastern sector. For the first time, China also departed from its previous position on Kashmir, declaring it to be a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan instead of unequivocally backing the latter.[70] However, during the fading years of the Leonid Brezhnev era (1964–1982), Soviet concern over the threat from China reached its height, and any sign of conciliation between India and China was resisted by the Kremlin. Nonetheless, slow and tentative steps were taken to reduce tension and the two countries began to explore ways to resolve their territorial disputes. In 1981, border talks commenced and were followed by seven more separate rounds of meetings that paved the way for future agreements. Since then, the process of Sino-Indian normalization has evolved slowly through three distinct yet reinforcing activities: summit meetings between heads of state and government; regular exchange visits between high-ranking military and nonmilitary officials and civilian officials; and a gradual process of institutionalizing a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs). This three-pronged process continues.

By most accounts, then, the process of Sino-Indian normalization has yielded significant results.[71] These include:

- The resumption and regularization of high-level exchange visits between Chinese and Indian government and military leaders to facilitate dialogue and consultation on bilateral, regional, and global issues.
- Expanded contacts and cooperation in a range of areas including trade, education, and cultural exchanges.
- Serious efforts at bridging the gap on border negotiations.
- Steady and gradual progress in military CBMs, leading to two major agreements (the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, and the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures).

Although the first two sets of activities paved the way for improved relations, the process of confidence-building not only institutionalized the relationship but also proved that the process of normalization was bearing results.[72]

The road to détente, however, has not always been smooth. Several incidents occurred during this period that set back the entire normalization process. First, New Delhi granted statehood to Arunachal Pradesh (originally the North East Frontier Agency) in December 1986. This was seen by China as an effort to impose the contentious McMahon Line on China—the original casus belli in 1962—and it prompted strong protests from Beijing, which charged that India had "seriously violated" China's territorial integrity and sovereignty.[73] Conversely, Chinese encroachments in western Ladakh, across the 1959 LAC, raised alarm among New Delhi government officials, who cautioned against compromise and concessions. The result was a process of action-reaction—intensified border patrols, official protests, and intrusions. Second, even as relations deteriorated, India's mid-1987 troop mobilization (part of Operation Chequerboard in Sumdorong Chu in the eastern sector) made the prospect of war seem alarmingly real.[74] Similarly, China's punitive war against Vietnam during the visit of Indian foreign minister Vajpayee in February 1979 and the Chinese nuclear test during Indian president R. Venkataraman's visit in May 1992 did not help the nascent process of normalization. And finally, China's own nuclear and missile program, as well as its reported supply of nuclear-weapon and missile technology to Pakistan (and conventional arms to other countries in the region), was another source of friction.[75]

Over the course of 1988, then, relations were somewhat tense; but as the international climate began to change, the prospects for Sino-Indian détente improved. In particular, as relations between Beijing and Moscow improved following the Mikhail Gorbachev reforms, Sino-Indian relations ceased to be a card to be played in the communist powers' poker game.[76] Despite Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's reiteration of India's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and India's declared policy of noninterference, Tibet remained a significant issue in bilateral relations; China remained concerned that a wave of nationalist sentiment in Lhasa or beyond could lead to spontaneous public support in India and an unwanted amount of international attention.[77] Links between right-wing Hindu parties and Tibetan independence groups were of special concern. Nonetheless, the two sides appeared to recognize the futility of confrontation, and moves to rebuild confidence proceeded apace.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in December 1988—the first such visit since 1954 when his grandfather, Jawaharlal Nehru, went to China—was a definitive moment in Sino-Indian relations. During the visit, India accepted China's proposition that bilateral relations could be expanded and improved before the resolution of the border issue. In response, China accepted India's time frame for the settlement of the dispute and the creation of a joint working group headed by the deputy foreign ministers. A tentative but significant program of CBMs was also put in place, including direct links for commercial airlines and telecommunications, cooperation in science and technology, and bilateral cultural exchanges. Although nothing was said on the Kashmir question, there was increasing sympathy for the Indian position given China's own separatist movement among the Tibetans in Tibet and the Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang.

In December 1991 Chinese premier Li Peng visited India—the first Chinese prime minister to do so since Zhou (Li Peng's foster father) visited India in 1960. The 1991 communiqué issued by Li Peng and Indian prime minister P. V. Narasimha Rao condemned the military dominance of the West in the post–Cold War era. Later, during the visit of President Venkataraman in May 1992, the Chinese president, Yang Shangkun, declared that cooperation between India and China was essential in order to avoid being "left behind" and "bullied by others." These visits were significant largely in terms of adding to the ongoing gestures of Sino-Indian reconciliation. The visits were followed by a major breakthrough in September 1993 when Prime Minister Rao attended a summit in Beijing, hosted by Premier Li. The two leaders penned the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, which called for the renunciation of force, recognition of and respect for the LAC, and the resolution of the border issue through negotiations. In addition, there were mutually agreed-upon troop reductions, and a process of transparency was introduced to help implement the agreement.

In particular, the border dispute was addressed through a series of meetings of the China-India Joint Working Group (JWG), which began its first meeting in July 1989. The two countries also celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the Panchsheel Agreement signed by Nehru and Zhou in 1954. A high point of these growing ties was reached in November 1996, when Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese president to pay an official visit to India. During this visit, both sides agreed on significant troop reductions along the LAC by signing the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures. However, no formal treaty was signed to settle the border dispute; the Tibetan and Sikkim questions were not addressed (Tibetan refugees who turned up in Delhi to protest were ignored); and China did not raise the Kashmir question again on behalf of Pakistan.

The evidence of this growing Sino-Indian détente was visible in almost every aspect of their bilateral relations. New institutional links were established among not only the military but also members of the strategic community, various political parties, as well as journalists. Scholarships and research opportunities for Chinese and Indian scholars were also increased in the early 1990s. Significantly, China and India explored cooperation in the space and nuclear fields during this period. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on bilateral cooperation in science, technology, and space in 1989. However, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Moscow reneged on an agreement to supply cryogenic engines to India, and Beijing did not offer its own cryogenic engines, primarily to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States, which opposed such a sale.[78] Nonetheless, in what appeared to be a major breakthrough in relations, China and India reached an agreement whereby China supplied uranium fuel for the Tarapur nuclear power plant under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.[79]

Perhaps the biggest gain made by the two countries was in the area of trade, which increased from a mere U.S.$117.4 million in 1987 to U.S.$700 million in 1993–1994; by 1998 it stood at U.S.$1.922 billion.[80] According to Surjit Mansingh, the primary reason for this low level of bilateral trade is the similarity in exportable goods—carpets, garments, handicrafts, hand tools, industrial components, light engineering, foods, and textiles. Another reason is that both are yet to establish the necessary infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, shipping lines, and banking channels) that are the basis of dynamic bilateral trade. Finally, both countries have promoted trade with the advanced industrial economies; it is no coincidence that the United States is the largest trading partner of India and the second largest (after Japan) of China.[81] However, the scale and scope of the U.S. trade figures are markedly different: whereas annual U.S.-China trade amounted to more than U.S.$116 billion in 2000 and covered a range of merchandise, U.S.-India trade in 2000 was a

mere U.S.$14 billion.[82] Clearly, although political tensions are likely to remain dominant, economic competition is bound to become fiercer.

Another indication of improved relations was the shift in Beijing's position regarding Kashmir as well as a noticeable "weakening of . . . verbal deterrent support for Pakistan," particularly during the 1986–1987 Brasstacks crisis (when India itself was involved in a spat with China over Sumdorong Chu).[83] The shift in China's position, which now tacitly acknowledged India's preeminence in South Asia, was also apparent in the case of India's intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the confrontation with Nepal in 1988. In the Sri Lankan case, Beijing initially supported Colombo on the Tamil insurgency, but it eventually (and quietly) severed military ties to Colombo and adopted a neutral position on the Indo–Sri Lankan confrontation. Similarly, in the case of Nepal, when Kathmandu purchased a substantial number of weapons from China in 1988, India responded by imposing an economic blockade. Beijing, however, did not publicly condemn India's actions.[84] Although China tried to support Nepal during the eighteen-month embargo by supplying vital goods and fuel, an increase in the exchange rate between the Chinese and Nepalese currencies actually raised the cost of Chinese goods well over prevailing global prices.[85] This was certainly a crucial factor in forcing Nepal to return to the Indian fold. Thus, by 1997 China had essentially acquiesced to New Delhi's dominant role in South Asia. But India's series of nuclear tests in the Pokhran Desert in May 1998 threatened to change everything.[86]

Pokhran II and Sino-Indian Relations, 1998–2002

In a letter to U.S. president Bill Clinton, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee explicitly linked the five nuclear tests conducted in Pokhran in May 1998 to "the overt nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962."[87] Although this was the clearest articulation of the link between India's nuclear weapons program and New Delhi's perceived nuclear threat from China, such a connection was not new, having dated to the very start of India's nuclear program.

The option to actually construct weapons was built into India's nuclear energy program from its inception in the early 1950s.[88] By mid-1963 India had completed construction of the CIRUS plutonium production reactor and the Trombay plutonium reprocessing plant, which, according to Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, gave India the weapon option in case of political and military necessity.[89] This came to be known as the "weapon option" policy, wherein India reserved the right to retain the ability to make nuclear weapons but chose not to exercise it. This policy, crafted primarily by Nehru, endured for the next thirty years.

Nehru, who (along with the probomb chief of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Homi Jehangir Bhabha) had been instrumental in creating this capability, was firmly opposed to building nuclear weapons. Even in October 1961 as Sino-Indian relations deteriorated, Nehru confessed to Beaton that the Chinese nuclear bomb "will not induce us to jump into the nuclear fray. The idea of using these bombs is horrible to me and a large number of us."[90] And again in December 1962, just after the traumatic Sino-Indian War, Nehru stated in a press conference: "It will not have the slightest effect on India if they (the Chinese) have a test tomorrow. . . . We are not going to make bombs (although) we are in nuclear science more advanced than China."[91]

Barely months after Nehru's death and coinciding with the first Chinese nuclear test, however, a spate of official and semiofficial declarations and pronouncements revealed an intensive debate within and outside government on the weapon option.[92] The opinions ranged considerably; on one end, some demanded that India should build up an independent deterrence, whereas another group insisted that India should not go nuclear under any provocation.[93] China's successful test of its device had sparked an outpouring of Indian strategic thought. It is not clear what impact this debate had on the decisionmaking process. However, within a year of the Chinese tests there was a discernible shift in the nuclear policy under the new Lal Bahadur Shastri government. For instance, in a speech in the Lok Sabha (the popularly elected house of parliament) on 24 November 1964, barely a month after the Chinese test, Prime Minister Shastri categorically reiterated the Nehru policy of not producing the bomb. However, at the sixty-ninth session of the Congress Party's conference at Durgapur in January 1965, Shastri said: "I cannot say anything about the future, but our present policy is not to manufacture the atom bomb, but to develop nuclear energy for constructive purposes." Following the Pakistani attack on India in September 1965

(which also raised the specter of a Sino-Pakistani collusion), this policy appears to have been further modified. On 16 November 1965, Shastri told the Rajya Sabha (the indirectly elected upper house of parliament) that India would reconsider its policy of not making nuclear weapons if China succeeded in stockpiling nuclear weapons and perfecting a delivery system. And in December 1965 K. C. Pant, the secretary of the Congress parliamentary party who had just returned from the UN General Assembly, said that his experiences in the United Nations dictated a rethinking of India's nuclear policy. He argued that China could occupy a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and hinted that India should acquire a nuclear capability, achieve parity with China, and thereby clinch its claim to a permanent council seat.[94]

Against this backdrop, Shastri launched a two-pronged strategy. The first was to seek nuclear guarantees; the second was to go ahead with the subterranean nuclear explosion project (SNEP) to validate the nuclear option. Some scholars argued (as was evident in the preceding debate) that India would have given up its option if it had been granted security assurances, possibly along the lines of extended deterrence within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Others have argued that seeking nuclear security guarantees was only an interim strategy and that in the long term India wanted to have its own deterrence capability. Thus, India began to hunt for nuclear guarantees from the United Nations (under the NPT regime) and then both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the United Kingdom. A Soviet guarantee had become a practical possibility following the Sino-Soviet split. However, when the guarantees were not forthcoming, the Indian government, prompted by Bhabha, sanctioned the SNEP and began to build a strong case for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). The Bhabha-Shastri combine came close to conducting the SNEP by 1966. But the sudden deaths of both Shastri and Bhabha appeared to have slowed the momentum.

SNEP, which was prompted by the Chinese test, eventually led to the Indian PNE, which was conducted in the Pokhran Desert on 18 May 1974. Although Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did not make an explicit connection between India's PNE and China's nuclear capability (in fact, she did not even proceed with weaponization but preferred to revert back to the weapon option policy), the Ministry of Defense did make this connection tacitly. The ministry's annual

report in the early 1970s noted the Chinese trend of developing ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and estimated that China had stockpiled about 150 nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, with a capacity of producing forty weapons of 20 kilotons annually. The report expressed particular concern about the medium-range ballistic missiles (with a range of up to 3,200 kilometers), which when operational were "capable of reaching targets in India from launching bases in Tibet."[95] A couple of years later the ministry's annual report stressed China's "massive efforts to develop nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems" as well as its "refusal to join the Preparatory Committee for World Disarmament."[96] The report also expressed concern at the "noticeable Chinese tendency to take interest in the affairs of the sub-continent to the detriment of the peace and co-operation enshrined in the Simla Agreement."[97] This suggests that the qualitative and quantitative improvement in China's nuclear weaponry—particularly its ability to strike targets in India from bases in Qinghai Province (formerly part of Greater Tibet)—as well as its interest in South Asian affairs was also a significant factor in the Indian decision to validate its nuclear option in the early 1970s. Interestingly, one of the earliest military uses considered for the new weapon was as demolition mines.[98] The plan for using nuclear mines, drawing largely on the experience of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when Chinese troops swarmed through the Himalayan passes and valleys in large numbers, proposed deploying devices in the passes to deter any future Chinese invasion.

Between 1964 and 1984 India's weapon option policy was primarily directed at the perceived nuclear threat from China. However, over the years the Indian program was also driven by domestic political and technological factors. Significantly, New Delhi considers its nuclear and missile capabilities to be symbols of international prestige; political leaders have also exploited this to enhance their own standing in domestic politics.[99]

By the early to mid-1980s, Indian analysts were convinced that Pakistan had put together an effective nuclear weapons program.[100] Pakistan's evolving nuclear weapons capability and the growing evidence of a Pakistan-China nuclear nexus, coupled with a series of military crises that India experienced with both China and Pakistan, gave new urgency to the notion that India had to respond to an increasingly dangerous strategic environment.[101] Thus, according to

Raju G. C. Thomas, the "decision to exercise this option in response to the Pakistani programme was then conditioned by the possible aggravation of the now largely dormant Chinese nuclear threat."[102]

This coupling of the existing Chinese threat with the emerging Pakistani one was clearly spelled out in Vajpayee's letter to Clinton:

> Although our relations with that country [China] have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours [Pakistan] to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years.[103]

Vajpayee's letter was not the only official Indian articulation of the China threat. In the weeks leading up to the May 1998 tests, India's defense minister, George Fernandes, a well-known sympathizer with both the Tibetan and Burmese causes, made a series of statements that expressed similar sentiments even more strongly. Soon after Islamabad flight-tested its Ghauri missile on 6 April 1998, Fernandes erroneously but rather provocatively noted that "China was the mother of Pakistan's Ghauri missile."[104] He also asserted that China had set up a monitoring station on Myanmar's Coco Islands, a remark that coincided with the first-ever visit of the PLA chief of staff, General Fu Quanyou, to New Delhi from 27 to 30 April 1998. Finally, a week before the tests, Fernandes claimed during a TV interview that "China is potential threat number one."[105] Although this might well have appeared to Beijing as a well-orchestrated tirade on the part of New Delhi, it was, in fact, an unfortunate coincidence: Fernandes was completely unaware of the impending tests.[106]

A combination of several other factors determined the immediate decision and timing of India's tests, including: the precarious political position of the coalition led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the BJP's desire to use the nuclear tests to buttress its domestic political strength; the pressure exerted by nuclear scientists to test a new generation of weapons; and the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the impending entry into force of the CTBT by the end of 1999. The dramatically altered international scenario at the end of the Cold War also drove New Delhi to testing. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic ascendance of the United States, India argued that without the bomb its ability to conduct an autonomous foreign and security policy would be severely compromised.[107] However, Vajpayee's letter and Fernandes's tirade, which rationalized the tests almost entirely in terms of China and its contribution to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, overshadowed the articulation of the other factors.

Beijing's initial response to India's 11 May 1998 nuclear tests was rather restrained. The official Xinhua News Agency reported the tests and an Indian naval missile test without further comments.[108] Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Zhu Bangzao expressed the Chinese government's deep concern over the tests and pointed out that these were contrary to the international trend and not conducive to peace and stability in South Asia. Two days later, India conducted a second round of tests. However, after the *New York Times* had published Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton alluding to the China threat as the justification for the nuclear tests, Beijing reacted angrily and strongly. A statement from the foreign affairs ministry on 14 May condemned India's behavior:

> In disregard of the strong opposition of the international community, the Indian government conducted two more nuclear tests on May 13 following the May 11 tests. The Chinese government is deeply shocked by this and hereby expresses its strong condemnation. This act of India's is nothing but an outrageous contempt for the common will of the international community for the comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and a hard blow on the international effort to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation. It will entail serious consequences to the peace and stability in South Asia and the World at large.[109]

Thus, it would appear that China was relatively unconcerned about the tests per se. For instance, despite being the moving force behind UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which condemned the tests, Beijing never even contemplated imposing sanctions, as Washington had. What upset the Chinese was India's insistence on using China as a justification, in addition to the statements about Tibet made by Fernandes, the defense minister, on the eve of the test. It was felt among Chinese officials that India had been foolhardy in reversing several years of extraordinarily promising political developments, which even included Chinese offers to assist India with its nuclear power program and the beleaguered Light Combat Aircraft program.

As subsequent commentaries by Chinese analysts have revealed,

India's nuclear weapons program and related pronouncements from New Delhi are, obviously, of major importance to Beijing. As for India, it would appear that officials were willing to risk the cooperative and burgeoning relationship with China because they felt that by going nuclear, India would have greater autonomy to chart out an independent foreign and security policy in an increasingly complex world. However, following the Chinese reaction, India toned down its anti-China rhetoric and articulated its concerns in more general terms.

Although it was true that Beijing exerted a lot of pressure on New Delhi to retract its China-threat rhetoric and cancelled a scheduled JWG meeting, China was also realistic enough not to let the downturn in bilateral relations drag out. Indeed, comments by both Brijesh Mishra (the principal secretary to the Indian prime minister) and President K. R. Narayanan—that India did not view China as a security threat in late 1998 and early 1999—were accepted by Beijing. A track II dialogue was initiated, paving the way to the gradual resumption of official bilateral contacts.[110]

Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh's June 1999 visit to China was another watershed in turning around bilateral relations. Occurring amid the Kargil crisis, the visit also served to demonstrate Beijing's neutrality in the conflict. China's stand during the Kargil crisis dispelled Indian concerns over possible Chinese support of Pakistan.[111] More important, a security dialogue was initiated, and Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxun reciprocated Jaswant Singh's visit in July 2000. President Narayanan visited China in June 2000 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Also, Li Peng, chair of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, and Premier Zhu Rongji visited India in January 2001 and January 2002, respectively, and Indian prime minister Vajpayee is scheduled to visit China in 2003.

As deep as the animosity appears to have been immediately after the Indian nuclear tests, the two countries have been able to overcome it relatively quickly.[112] In fact, compared with the immediate post-test period, the current bilateral relationship gives rise to some optimism.[113] High-level visits have been restored, and substantial progress has been made in trade, scientific and technological cooperation, and aviation. Although New Delhi and Beijing remain wary of each other's long-term intentions as both acquire greater economic and military power, neither side finds its fundamental interests served by using openly adversarial terms. Indeed, since the visit by Indian foreign minister Singh in June 1999, the two countries have on many occasions publicly avowed that they do not view each other as a security threat.

The JWG meetings also resumed, and at their thirteenth meeting (in 2001) the two sides, for the first time, exchanged maps on the alignments of the middle sector of the LAC (the least disputed section of the LAC)—a small but concrete step toward resolving the decades-old territorial dispute. Although the exchange of maps of the western sector of the LAC did not take place in June 2002, they might be exchanged in the near future, followed by those for the eastern sector of the LAC (the most contentious section of the LAC).[114] At the fourteenth JWG meeting in New Delhi in November 2002, it was decided to further examine the issue at the JWG's diplomatic and military experts meeting in Beijing in January 2003. Also significant is the resumption of military-to-military contacts that have seen port calls, exchanges of military officers for educational purposes, regular flag meetings between local commanders at the border regions, and high-level visits by top military brass, including a December 2001 visit to India by Lieutenant General Zhang Li, the PLA's deputy chief of the General Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Anil Yashwant Tipnis's May 2001 visit to China.[115]

Although the events of 11 September 2001 and after—particularly the U.S. presence in Central Asia—have complicated matters, for the time being New Delhi and Beijing are back on track in developing normal relations. In fact, in early 2002 the two countries added a dialogue on countering terrorism to their growing list of bilateral discussions.[116]

This gradual but substantive progress can be attributed to a number of factors, both external and internal. As the noted Chinese scholar Ye Zhengjia has pointed out, India and China both face serious challenges from globalization, the information revolution, and the revolution in military affairs. To remain embroiled in bilateral conflicts serves neither, and in the final analysis both countries are potential victims of power politics and might logically wish to join hands in working for a more equitable and just international political order. However, serious obstacles to normal relations remain. In the remaining chapters we examine these obstacles and analyze how they are likely to affect Sino-Indian relations.

Notes

1. The only exception appears to be during the period of the primarily nomadic Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368 A.D.). This regime, which at one point occupied the Eurasian continent from Germany in the west to Korea in the east and from the Arctic Ocean in the north to Turkey and the Persian Gulf in the south, treated both China and India as one of their many conquests. Prior to this only the Kushan Empire (1–225 A.D.) in India shared a common border with the Han Empire (202 B.C. to 220 A.D.) in Central Asia, close to the Taklak Makan Desert in Tibet. See B. G. Verghese, *Reorienting India: The New Geo-Politics of Asia* (New Delhi: Konark Publishers for the Centre for Policy Research, 2001); Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), pp. 31, 37, and 48; and Karl J. Schmidt, *An Atlas and Survey of South Asian History* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 22–23.

2. There were, however, two exceptions. First, the Kushan Empire built extensive trade networks—both overland and overseas—with China during the later Han period (25–225 A.D.). During this time goods from China were primarily transshipped to the West, although some were also consumed domestically. Second, during the middle Chola period (98–1044 A.D.)—which corresponded to the Song period in China—Emperor Rajendra I conducted a naval expedition to Srivijaya (in present-day Indonesia) around 1025 A.D. to protect the Chola trade with China. Similarly, one of the few times that the Chinese empire launched sea expeditions was under Emperor Yongle of the Ming Dynasty when Chinese admiral Zheng He embarked on seven voyages to Southeast Asia, Ceylon, India, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa between 1405 and 1433. However, this seaborne contact ended because the dynasty became preoccupied with countering the Mongol threat from the north and piracy along China's southern coast. See Satish Chandra, "India and China—Oceanic, Educational and Technological Cooperation," *Journal of Indian Ocean Studies* 10:2 (August 2002), pp. 165–170; Verghese, *Reorienting India*, pp. 3–8; Schmidt, *An Atlas and Survey of South Asian History*, pp. 32 and 98; and Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, pp. 31, 53.

3. Two of the most notable Chinese travelers were Buddhist monks. Fa-hsien arrived in India in 399 A.D. via the Tamrin Basin and Pamir overland route and returned to China in 414 A.D. by sea. Hsuan-Tsang left for India in 629 A.D. and returned to China in 645 A.D. via the overland Central Asian route.

4. This competition is likely to revive during the current phase of globalization as both China and India eagerly vie for a larger portion of the lucrative world market in almost the same kinds of goods and raw materials.

5. Even in the post–Cold War world, China and India might well be forced into alliances with non-Asian powers against other non-Asian powers. An alternative scenario is that some non-Asian powers might incorporate either China or India into a confrontation against either the other or a third Asian power.

6. A China-India competition has been regarded as inevitable ever since their emergence as modern states in the 1940s. Different scholars have explained this competition in terms of Asian nationalism, strategic goals, civilizational factors, strategic culture, balance-of-power theory, and the process of state formation. For Asian nationalism, see Lucian Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985); for security complex see Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); for strategic culture see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post–Cold War Period," in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 261–318, and George Tanham, "India's Strategic Culture," *Washington Quarterly* 15:1 (Winter 1992), pp. 129–142; for civilizational theory see Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); and for the balance-of-power theory see Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, and the Restoration of Peace, 1812–1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), and Therese Delpech, "Nuclear Weapons and the 'New World Order': Early Warning from Asia," *Survival* 40:4 (Winter 1998–1999), pp. 57–76. For an alternative perspective that takes into account the impact of the process of state formation on China and India, see Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, *China the World and India* (New Delhi: Samskriti, 2001), esp. pp. 325–345 ("1962 Revisited").

7. There are several excellent studies that examine the history and origins of the Sino-Indian border dispute that led up to the 1962 war. See, for instance, Gyaneshwar Chaturvedi, *India-China Relations: 1947 to Present* (Agra: M G Publishers, 1991); W. F. Van Eekelen, *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964); Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries* (London: Praeger, 1964); *Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem* (New York: Praeger, 1968); Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970); Parshotam Mehra, *Negotiating with the Chinese, 1846–1987: Problems and Perspectives* (New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1989); Mohan Ram, *Politics of Sino-Indian Confrontation* (Delhi: Vikas, 1973); Sahdev Vohra, *The Northern Frontier of India—The Border Dispute with China* (New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1993); and Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political View of the British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries* (New York: Praeger, 1969).

8. Henry McMahon was the foreign secretary of British India at the time of the 1914 Simla Agreement; this now infamous line bearing his name was drawn on a small two-sheet, eight-miles-to-the-inch map with a pencil prompting Nehru to once declare that it "may make a difference of 50 miles or more if this line is thick or thin." See John Lall, *Aksaichin and Sino-*

Indian Conflict (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1989), p. 242, and Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 107. For details of the map see *An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1960), and *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962).

9. Although independent India did question some aspects of the McMahon Line, it did accept the overall principle of watersheds and natural boundaries being key determinants in marking the border. To that extent, it was more amenable to accepting the McMahon Line, despite its colonial legacy, than were the Chinese. An alternative explanation is that independent India considered itself the successor to British India and was, therefore, willing to accept the British geostrategic approach, especially one of favoring buffer states. This was certainly evident in Nehru's attitude toward Tibet, and later Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.

10. Indeed, in October 1949, Mao, in his response to a congratulatory message from B. T. Randive, the secretary-general of the Communist Party of India, on China's successful communist revolution, exalted Randive and the Indian Communists to overthrow "the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators" in India. See C. V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, *India and China: The Way Ahead After "Mao's India War"* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000), p. 25.

11. See Surjit Mansingh, "India and the United States," in B. R. Nanda, ed., *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Sangam Books, 1990), pp. 162–163.

12. John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

13. China and India share a 2,000-kilometer border that is divided into the eastern, middle, and western sectors and affects more than 125,000 square kilometers of disputed territories. See Chen Tiqiang, "Zhongyin bianjie wenti de falu fangmian [Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Boundary Problem]," *Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies]*, no. 1 (January 1982), pp. 11–42; Jing Hui, "Zhongyin dongduan bianjie zhenxiang [The Truth About the Eastern Sector of Sino-Indian Boundary]," *Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies]*, no. 1 (January 1988), pp. 6–12, 30; Jing Hui, "Youguan zhongyin bianjie zhengduan de yixie qingkuang he beijing [Some Facts About the Background of the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute]," *Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies]*, no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 1–8; Xuecheng Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), p. 47.

14. Wang Hongwei, *Ximalayashan qingjie: zhongyin guanxi yanjiu [The Himalayan Sentiment: A Study of Sino-Indian Relations]* (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe [China Tibetan Studies Press], 1998), esp. chapters 3 and 4.

15. Ranganathan and Khanna, *India and China*, p. 31.

16. Tsering Shakya, *The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947* (London: Pimlico, 1999); Ranganathan and Khanna, *India and China*, pp. 26–27.

17. Garver, *Protracted Contest*, chapter 2.

18. See Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India, 29 April 1954, in Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, appendix I. In Sanskrit, *panchsheel* literally means "five virtues," and under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence Between India and China these were elaborated as mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Although originally enunciated in the context of China, *Panchsheel* became the lynchpin of Indian diplomacy.

19. The seriousness of the differences on this issue is evident in the correspondence between China and India on the subject. Nehru best states the Indian position on the border issue in a letter to Zhou on 14 December 1958. The letter, which was in response to maps presented by China showing large portions of northeastern India as part of China, categorically stated that "there were no border disputes between our respective countries" and that any border differences and other outstanding problems had been settled by the 1954 agreement. Nehru also asked why the maps with the disputed territory had not been presented earlier. He also noted that China had accepted its border with Burma on the basis of the McMahon Line and that Zhou had proposed to recognize this border with India as well. Zhou's terse reply to Nehru's letter on 23 January 1959 provides the best articulation of the Chinese position on the issue. The letter stated that "border disputes do exist between China and India" and that the "Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been signed between the Chinese central government and the Indian government." He also challenged the applicability of the McMahon Line to the Sino-Indian border on the grounds that the "McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibetan region of China." He, however, agreed to negotiate the boundary of the eastern sector on the basis of the McMahon Line, which Nehru rejected. See Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, *White Paper No. I* (New Delhi: Government of India), pp. 48, 52–53, and 56.

20. Cited in K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962," in B. R. Nanda, ed., *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Sangam Books, 1990), p. 117. Although India had embarked on a major armament and modernization drive by the mid-1950s, the earliest its enhanced military capabilities would have become operational was the mid-1960s.

21. For Indian and Chinese versions of these talks and their breakdown, see Ranganathan and Khanna, *India and China*, and Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*.

22. Indian Ministry of External Affairs, White Paper No. I, p. 54, cited in Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, p. 21.

23. Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, p. 26.

24. Ibid., pp. 139–140 (Zhou's elaboration is taken from n. 56, p. 146).

25. Ibid., p. 23.

26. See Ramananda Sengupta, "The CIA Circus: Tibet's Forgotten Army," *Outlook*, 15 February 1999. See also Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 19, and George Patterson, *Peking Versus Delhi* (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), p. 298.

27. Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, p. 24.

28. *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1960).

29. J. R. Saigal, *The Unfought War of 1962: The NEFA Debacle* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1979), p. 19.

30. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis*.

31. One reason for this unilateral withdrawal may well have been the Chinese fear that with the onset of winter in a couple of weeks the high Himalayan passes that they had crossed would become snowbound and unusable, thus cutting off their vital supply lines. See K. C. Praval, *Indian Army After Independence* (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1990), p. xi.

32. Apart from Ceylon, these countries were Burma, Cambodia, Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia.

33. The proposals called for the McMahon Line to be made into the cease-fire line in the eastern sector and for the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the western sector, which would be jointly administered by civilian posts. For details of the Colombo proposals, see Ranganathan and Khanna, *India and China*, pp. 49–51, and Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, pp. 41–42.

34. Wang, *The Himalayan Sentiment*, pp. 246–250.

35. *Peking Review*, 8 November 1963, p. 19.

36. Strobe Talbott, ed., *Krushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 308–311.

37. Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers*, p. 290.

38. Mansingh, "India and the United States," p. 167.

39. J. P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to Sino-Indian War of 1962* (New Delhi: Thacker, 1969), pp. 478–479.

40. Interview with former senior official of the Indian defense ministry, New Delhi, March 2000.

41. Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, p. 40.

42. Ibid.

43. Although the Chinese nuclear weapon program began in the mid-1950s and was probably spurred on by the experience of the Korean War and the U.S. nuclear threat during the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, it is possible that the fear of superpower intervention during the Sino-Indian War lent a new urgency to acquire this capability at the earliest. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 71–72. See also Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*, esp. chapter 7.

44. For a more optimistic assessment, see Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962," p. 130, where he argues that if the magnitude of the crisis that faced India is taken into account, then "it would seem that Nehru pulled [it] through at a relatively low cost."

45. Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1992), pp. 207–208.

46. Ashutosh Varshney, "The Folly of America's Nuclear Diplomacy," *Financial Times*, 6 August 1998.

47. Here it might be interesting to compare the Indo-Pakistani experience with the Sino-Indian one in the sphere of cease-fire lines. In the Indo-Pakistani case, the cease-fire line of 1947–1948 was eventually converted into the Line of Control under the 1972 Simla Agreement (which was the formal peace agreement following the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War) and clearly demarcated for 740 kilometers from Sangam (near Jammu) to point NJ 9842 (short of the Siachen Glacier) using a six-point grid reference. In contrast, in the Sino-Indian case, whereas the cease-fire line of 21 November 1962 was designated the Line of Actual Control, there was no bilateral agreement that clearly demarcated this line, and even today there is disagreement on both sides as to the precise location of the LAC in many places. One reason for this aberration was that unlike the Indo-Pakistani case, China and India did not negotiate a peace agreement but simply broke off all relations. Another Chinese concern was that the LAC, if and when demarcated, might become the de facto or even a semi–de jure border. Thus, even today the LAC remains undemarcated. For details and history of the demarcation of the Line of Control see M. L. Chibber, "Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir—A Part of Simla Agreement," available online at www.vijayinkargil.org/perspectives/LoC.html. For the origins of the LAC see Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, pp. 176–177.

48. V. G. Kulkarni, "Eyeball to Eyeball on the Himalayan Border," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter *FEER*), 9 April 1987, pp. 36, 40; "Hands Across the Himalayas," *The Economist*, 11 September 1993, p. 31.

49. Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine, "China and India: Moving Beyond Confrontation," *Problems of Communism* 38:2–3 (March–June 1989), pp. 30–49.

50. Steven M. Goldstein, "Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 224–265; Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962); Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

51. For Indo-Soviet relations see S. Nihal Singh, *The Yogi and the Bear: A Study of Indo-Soviet Relations* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1986). On the origin of the Sino-U.S. opening, see Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Opening to America, 1968–1982," in John K. Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 15 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 402–472.

52. See Yaarov Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1960–1980* (New York: Praeger, 1982), for the origins of this relationship. For a more recent analysis, see Garver, *Protracted Contest*, chapters 7 and 8.

53. However, China also unilaterally extended its ultimatum to conve-

niently allow both India and Pakistan to accept the UN Security Council cease-fire resolution. In fact, even the assessment of New Delhi was that the Sikkim incident was "all show and no substance." See Leo E. Rose, "India and China: Forging a New Relationship," in Shalendra D. Sharma, ed., *The Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security and Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 2000), p. 226. See also Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente*, p. 38.

54. B. N. Goswami, *Pakistan and China* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), pp. 118–119. For possible motives behind China's support for Pakistan, see Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente*, p. 40.

55. See Robert G. Wirsing, "The Arms Race in South Asia," *Asian Survey* 25:3 (March 1985), p. 276, Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente*, p. 90, and Mushaid Hussain, "Pakistan-China Defence Cooperation," *International Defence Review* 26:2 (February 1993), pp. 108–111.

56. Cited in Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente*, p. 47.

57. Upon his return from Beijing, Kissinger reportedly told the Indian ambassador in Washington that if India and Pakistan went to war and China became involved on the side of Pakistan, "we [the US] would be unable to help you against China." See Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power—Kissinger in the White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 452. See also Singh, *The Yogi and the Bear*, pp. 87–89.

58. Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente*, p. 48.

59. Ibid.

60. For details of the USS *Enterprise* episode, see Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation," Adelphi Paper No. 313 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 19.

61. Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente*, p. 49.

62. Ibid., p. 35. In contrast, article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 does make such an explicit commitment.

63. Ibid., p. 38.

64. Rose, "India and China: Forging a New Relationship," p. 228. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 1971 war China took it upon itself to replenish Pakistan's armed forces without cost. See Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente*, p. 60.

65. Vertzberger, *The Enduring Entente*, p. 52.

66. This reluctance on the part of China was to some extent on account of the emerging Indo-Pakistan crisis. See ibid., p. 56.

67. Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, p. 126.

68. Subramanian Swamy, *India's China Perspective* (New Delhi: Konark, 2001), p. 101.

69. Mansingh and Levine, "China and India," p. 36; Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, pp. 124–125.

70. Arul B. Louis, "A Thaw in the Himalayas," *FEER*, 4 July 1980, pp. 26–27; John W. Garver, "Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente," *Political Science Quarterly* 111:2 (Summer 1996), pp. 326–333.

71. Rosemary Foot, "Chinese-Indian Relations and the Process of Building Confidence: Implications for the Asia-Pacific," *Pacific Review* 9:1 (1996), pp. 58–76; Kanti Bajpai and Bonnie L. Coe, "Confidence Building Between India and China," in Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds., *Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 199–226; Ye Zhengjia, "Sino-Indian Friendship and Cooperation Contribute to Peace and Development in Asia and the World at Large," *Studia Diplomatica* 49:4–5 (1996), pp. 111–120; and Sony Devabhaktuni, Matthew C. J. Rudolph, and Amit Sevak, "Key Developments in the Sino-Indian CBM Process," in Michael Krepon et al., eds., *A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1998), pp. 201–204.

72. Dilip Bobb, "Rajiv Gandhi in China: Breaching the Wall," *India Today*, 15 January 1989, pp. 14–21; Robert Delfs and Rita Manchanda, "Return to Realism," *FEER*, 5 January 1989, pp. 10–11; Lincoln Kaye, "Bordering on Peace," *FEER*, 16 September 1993, p. 13; Shekhar Gupta and Sudeep Chakravarti, "Sino-Indian Relations: Vital Breakthrough," *India Today*, 30 September 1993, p. 23; Rahul Bedi, "India, China Set to Ease Tension," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 December 1996, p. 14; Dipankar Bannerjee, "Upbeat About Sino-Indian Ties," *Trends*, 28–29 December 1996, p. iv.

73. Mohan Ram, "Bluster on the Border," *FEER*, 1 January 1987, pp. 22–23, and Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, p. 142.

74. For origin, background, and analysis, see Robert G. Sutter, *China-India Border Friction: Background Information and Possible Implications*, CRS Report for Congress 87-514F (19 June 1987), and John W. Garver, "Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente," *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 1996, pp. 323–347. See also Salamat Ali, "Tension on the Border," *FEER*, 7 May 1987, pp. 33–35; David Bonavia, "Troubled Frontiers," *FEER*, 4 September 1986, pp. 14–15; "Eye-witness in Tibet," *FEER*, 4 June 1987, p. 46; and Salamat Ali, "China Ups the Ante," *FEER*, 21 May 1987, p. 40.

75. See R. Jeffrey Smith and David B. Ottaway, "Spy Photo Suggests China Missile Trade," *Washington Post*, 3 July 1995; Smith, "China Linked to Pakistani Missile Plant," *Washington Post*, 23 August 1996; Douglas Waller, "The Secret Missile Deal," *Time*, 30 June 1997, p. 58; and "Fernandes Sees No Threat from Ghauri," *The Hindu*, 10 April 1998. See also "Overview," in *Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1999), pp. xxxvi–xxxvii.

76. John W. Garver, "The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations," *The China Quarterly* 125 (March 1991), pp. 55–85.

77. See Surjit Mansingh, "India-China Relations in the Post–Cold War Era," *Asian Survey* 34:3 (March 1994), p. 299.

78. Ibid., p. 296.

79. Hamish McDonald, "Nuclear Pay-Off: China to Supply Enriched Uranium to India," *FEER*, 19 January 1995.
80. See "India-China Relations," in *India's Foreign Relations*, available online at www.meadev.nic.in/foreign/ind-china.htm.
81. Mansingh, "India-China Relations in the Post–Cold War Era," p. 295.
82. Wayne M. Morrison, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB91121 (13 April 2001); U.S. Census Bureau, "India-US Trade Statistics for 2000," available online at www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/ind_us_trade_2000.html.
83. Garver, "Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente," pp. 337–343.
84. Ibid.
85. Rose, "India and China: Forging a New Relationship," pp. 226–227.
86. These tests have been collectively called "Pokhran II" to distinguish them from the first nuclear test also conducted in Pokhran in 1974. See "India Bombs the Ban," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 54:4 (July/August 1998), for details of the tests. See also "Special Feature," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 10:7 (July 1998), particularly T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj, "Indian Blasts Surprise the World, but Leave Fresh Doubts," pp. 19–21, and W. P. S. Sidhu, "India Sees Safety in Nuclear Triad and Second Strike Potential," pp. 23–25.
87. See *New York Times*, 13 May 1998, p. A14, for the full text of the Indian prime minister's letter.
88. See George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Itty Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State* (London: Zed Books, 1999); Peter R. Lavoy, "Learning to Live with the Bomb: India and Nuclear Weapons, 1947–1974," Ph.D. diss., University of California–Berkeley, 1997; Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "The Development of an Indian Nuclear Doctrine Since 1980," Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge, February 1997; and Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Indian Nuclear Strategy, 1947–1991," Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1991.
89. Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), p. 141.
90. Cited in A. Lall, *Negotiating Disarmament: The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: The First Two Years—1962–64* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 66.
91. Quoted in G. G. Mirchandani, *India's Nuclear Dilemma* (New Delhi: Popular Books, 1966), p. 22.
92. Vajpayee, who was then a young member of parliament, categorically stated in the Lok Sabha that "the answer to an atom bomb is an atomic bomb, nothing else." See Manoj Joshi, "Nuclear Shock Waves," *India Today International*, 25 May 1998, p. 14.
93. For a sampling of this debate see R. K. Nehru, "The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb—I," *India Quarterly*, January 1965, pp. 3–14; M. R. Masani, "The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb—II," *India Quarterly*, January 1965, pp. 15–28; and Raj Krishna, "India and the Bomb," *India Quarterly*, April 1965, pp. 123 and 127–128.

94. J. K. Ray, *Security in the Missile Age* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1967), p. 130.
95. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, *Annual Report, 1970–1971* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1971), pp. 1–2.
96. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, *Annual Report, 1972–1973* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1973), p. 7.
97. Ibid.
98. Major General D. Som Dutt, "The Defence of India's Northern Borders," Adelphi Paper No. 25 (1966).
99. These are elaborated in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "India's Security and Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures," Stimson Center Report No. 26, Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures in Southern Asia, November 1998, pp. 1–47 (available online at www.stimson.org/pubs/cbm/sa/index.html); and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "India's Nuclear Use Doctrine," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Planning the Unthinkable: New Proliferators and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 125–157.
100. See, for example, D. K. Palit and P. K. S. Namboodri, *Pakistan's Islamic Bomb* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982).
101. India and Pakistan witnessed a series of crises that stopped short of actual war. These were played out against the emerging nuclear scenario in the subcontinent and occurred in 1983–1984, 1986–1987, and 1990. For details of these crises see Sidhu, "India's Nuclear Use Doctrine," pp. 132–142. The Sino-Indian crisis in 1986–1987 at Sumdorong Chu does not appear to have involved nuclear weapons. For details see Garver, *Protracted Contest*, pp. 216–242.
102. Raju G. C. Thomas, "South Asian Security in the 1990s," Adelphi Paper No. 278 (July 1993), p. 64.
103. See *New York Times*, 13 May 1998, p. A14, for full text of the Indian prime minister's letter.
104. Manoj Joshi, "George in a China Shop," *India Today International*, 18 May 1998.
105. See *Agence France-Presse*, "China Bigger Threat to India Than Pakistan: Defence Minister," 3 May 1998.
106. Fernandes was informed of the tests only a couple of days before 11 May 1998. See Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, p. 415.
107. See Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," *Foreign Affairs* 77:5 (September/October 1998), pp. 41–52.
108. *Jiefang junbao* [*Liberation Army Daily*], 13 May 1998, p. 1.
109. "China's Statement on India's Nuclear Tests," *Beijing Review*, 1–7 June 1998, p. 7.
110. Interviews with Chinese analysts, Shanghai and Beijing, March 2001.
111. John W. Garver, "The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Follow-

ing India's Nuclear Tests," *The China Quarterly* 168 (December 2001), pp. 865–889; Swaran Singh, "The Kargil Conflict: The Why and How of China's Neutrality," *Strategic Analysis* 23:7 (October 1999), pp. 1083–1094.

112. Garver, "The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity."

113. Manoranjan Mohanty, "A World to Win," *Hindustan Times*, 31 January 2002, p. 10; Jing-dong Yuan, "Sino-Indian Ties," *The Hindu*, 31 January 2002, p. 8; and V. V. Paranjpe, "Agenda of Hope," *Hindustan Times*, 14 January 2002, available online at www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/140102/detide01.asp.

114. Press Trust of India, "India, China Hold Defence Talks," 23 September 2002.

115. Hong Kong Agence France-Presse, "India, China Leave It to Experts to Iron Out Thorny Border Dispute," 22 November 2002.

116. Sanjeev Miglani, "India and China Vow to Fight Terrorism," Reuters, 15 January 2002, and "China to Cooperate with India in Combating Terrorism," *Hindustan Times*, 14 January 2002 available online at www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/140102/dlnat74.asp.

2

LOCKED IN AN (IN)SECURITY COMPLEX

Despite sharing a common, albeit largely disputed, border, China and India perceive the *region* quite differently. For New Delhi, its region of strategic concern (traditionally, South Asia, or southern Asia) "extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to across the Straits of Malacca in the east, and from the Central Asian Republics in the north to the equator in the south."[1] This strategic area encompasses the member countries of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC, which includes India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives), China, Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar. In contrast, Beijing has traditionally excluded itself from India's strategic space and has narrowly confined South Asia to include only the SAARC countries.[2] Indeed, none of the three Chinese defense white papers released so far explicitly identify South Asia as a strategic region of interest; instead, they normally make references to countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Japan, Korea, and the Asia Pacific region—when discussing the general international security environment.[3] Even when South Asia is mentioned, as was the case in the 1998 white paper, it referred only to the May 1998 nuclear tests and warned that those tests "seriously impeded the international non-nuclear arms proliferation efforts and produced grave consequences [for] peace and stability in the South Asian region and the rest of the world"—indicating that they might not directly affect China's security.[4]

However, as Indian analyst Sujit Dutta has argued, China be-