Transnational Religious Actors and International Order (Jeffrey Haynes, London Metropolitan University; email: jeff.haynes@londonmet.ac.uk)

Religion impacts on international relations with ramifications for international order. The first part of the paper addresses this issue conceptually. The second part of the paper examines the issue empirically, with an examination of two transnational religious actors: American Evangelical Protestants and al-Qaeda.

There is renewed scholarly interest in the involvement of religion in international relations, with a focus on both state and non-state actors. Religion’s renewed significance is observable among many cultures and religious faiths and in countries at various levels of economic development. For many observers and scholars, this was unexpected because it challenged conventional wisdom about the nature and long-term historical impact of secularisation, calling into question a core presumption of Western social science: As societies modernise they invariably secularise, with consequential effects for religion, which is both marginalised and ‘privatised’, excluded from the public realm.

The ‘return’ of religion to international relations necessarily involves deprivatisation, with implications for international order. Recent challenges to international order emanate from various entities, notably Islamic ‘extremists’, people often said to be ‘excluded’ from the benefits of globalisation for reasons of culture, history and geography. Islamic extremist pathologies present themselves in various order-challenging forms, including the 9/11 assault on the USA and the November 2008 atrocity in Mumbai that killed 170 people.

Transnational Religion Actors and International Order: Conceptual Issues

International order is a regime characterised by widespread – although not necessarily universal – acceptance of certain values and norms of behaviour, involving a range of actors, rules, mechanisms and understandings. The expanding corpus of international law is central to the concept of international order, as are the various organisations and institutions that seek to develop and embed it, including the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation. The overall aim is to try to manage as consensually as possible co-existence and the complex interdependence of states and important non-state actors, although it is widely accepted that ‘international order’ serves the interests of the dominant international actors.

The concept of international order centres on two main themes: (1) more or less consensual international acceptance of common values and norms – including the body of international law, and (2) development of institutions geared to preserve and develop international order. This combination of structures and processes – involving various actors, rules, mechanisms and understandings – serves overall to manage the co-existence and interdependence of states and non-state actors. In the literature there is no consensus about the impact of transnational religious actors on international order, although there is general acceptance that various religious actors can influence international order.

At the end of the Cold war, 20 years ago, there appeared to be a window of opportunity to establish the contours of a new, post-conflict consensual framework for international order, primarily based on the dissemination of Western values and norms. In the early 1990s, the then US president, George H. W. Bush, spoke confidently about the birth of a ‘new world order’ following the collapse of the Soviet Union, predicated on the strengthening of international law, global and regional organisations, especially the United Nations and the
To what extent are religious belief systems associated with specific political ideologies? In some cases, existence of a connection is not difficult to demonstrate. Close links exist, for example, between: Hindu chauvinism (or ‘fundamentalism’) and ultra-nationalism in India, Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, and new Buddhist movements and demands for a more just social, political and economic order in Thailand. More generally, religious leaders and movements in many countries express views on various non-religious issues, including:

- the nature of desirable governmental, development, human rights and economic systems
- preferences regarding international relations, and
- the type of social mores, customs and manners that should predominate both domestically and internationally.

Many religious groups with political aims endeavour to achieve their objectives by focusing efforts on both domestic and international fields of action. And this can impact upon international order. For example, the Iranian revolution of 1979 helped to stimulate an increase in expressions of radical Islam, both in relation to domestic ‘non-Islamic’ governments, especially in the Middle East, as well as encouraging a perception in the West that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is a significant and persistent threat to both Western security in particular and international order more generally.

In addition, the impact of religion on international relations has attained increased prominence as a result of globalisation. This is because globalisation facilitates increased links between state and non-state actors. This increases the ability of religious actors to spread their messages and to link up with like-minded groups; geographical distance is no longer an insuperable barrier to cross-border links between such actors. Peter Beyer explains that ‘We now live in a globalizing social reality, one in which previously effective barriers to communication no longer exist’. The result is that cross-border links between various religious actors have recently multiplied, and so have their international concerns, many of which are linked to international order issues.

Some transnational religious actors can be seen to help advance international order. Increasing and improving international order is said to be dependent on growing numbers of democratic countries, in accord with the wishes and designs of the dominant actors in international relations, such as the government of the United States and other Western states. The Roman Catholic Church was noteworthy in this regard from the 1980s, encouraging authoritarian regimes to democratise, especially in Catholic parts of the world, such as, Latin America and parts of Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. In addition, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference is also seen to have an important role in helping build international order, helping to promote dialogue and cooperation between Muslim and Western governments.
On the other hand, the actions of some transnational religious actors, including terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taibar, implicated in the recent atrocities in Mumbai, have quite different ramifications for international order. Such groups explicitly reject and seek to undermine (1) the foundational norms, values, institutions and rules that underpin international order and its key institutions, such as the United Nations (Haynes 2005c). In addition, they offer a competing logic to the sovereignty-based state system and seek undermine Muslims’ popular allegiance to their nation-states. The 2005 Human Security Report highlighted the significant threats that transnational religious terrorist groups pose to international order. The Report noted that: ‘International terrorism is the only form of political violence that appears to be getting worse. Some datasets have shown an overall decline in international terrorist incidents of all types since the early 1980s, but the most recent statistics suggest a dramatic increase in the number of high-casualty attacks since the September 11 attacks on the US

Such transnational non-state actors rarely control territory for long – although the Taliban government in Afghanistan did allow Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda considerable freedom of movement in the country from the mid-1990s until late 2001, brought to an end by the US-led bombardment and subsequent invasion. More generally, ‘failed’ states, such as that of Pakistan, may facilitate formation and development of religious terrorist organisations, including Lashkar-e-Taibar, allowing greater freedom of action than when there is a strong central government.

In sum, a combination of circumstances – including events that followed the end of the Cold War and the continuing impact of globalisation – encouraged various transnational religious actors to focus upon international order. This reflected not only generally increased involvement of religion in international relations but also highlighted how easily domestic issues can ‘spill over’ to become issue of regional or international concern. For example, both Hamas and Hezbullah have fought Israel in conflicts that are as much about competing religious beliefs as they are about secular nationalist goals. These conflicts illustrate how domestic and international political issues can feed off each other to present significant challenges to international order, with religious values and norms of central concern.

The post-9/11 focus on extremist Islamist organisations reignited the ‘clash of civilisations’ controversy, while serving partially to obscure the evolving transnational religious landscape with its impact on a variety of international issues. This is characterised by both conflict and cooperation, with the latter centring on various human rights and development issues. Informing both developments is the impact of various facets of globalisation, especially the communications revolution. These are key factors in encouraging dynamic growth of transnational networks of religious actors. In addition, over the past two decades or so, global migration patterns have also helped spawned more active transnational religious communities. The overall result is a new religious pluralism that has impacted upon international relations in two key ways. First, there has been an emergence of ‘global religious identities’ that may lead to increasing interreligious dialogues, involving greater religious engagement around various issues, including international development, conflict resolution, and transitional justice. On the other hand, this globalising environment can also encourage greater, often more intense, interreligious competition, between members of various religious faiths and traditions.

The contention of this paper is that the dynamics of the new religious pluralism influence the global political landscape, with significant impacts upon international order. To provide
evidence for the claim that (1) transnational religious actors are influential in international relations and (2) what they do can be important for international order, the paper focuses on two sets of transnational religious actors: American Evangelical Protestants and al-Qaeda.

These two entities are the focus of the next two sections of the paper for the following reasons. First, American Evangelical Protestants are said to be the ‘new internationalists’, with representative organisations developing in recent years an international agenda characterised by a focus on improved outcomes relating to development, health, and religious freedom, especially in Arab/Muslim Middle East. Second, al-Qaeda has also sought to develop its transnational influence in recent years, encouraging ‘ordinary’ Muslims around the world to get involved in its anti-US and anti-Western activities. In sum, these two sets of actors wish to see the spread and development of very different values and norms, which collectively impact on international order, and they use their transnational networks to try to effect these changes.

Transnational religious actors aim to spread influence by establishment and development of cross-border networks, through application and development of religious ‘soft power’. This paper will not be concerned with this issue in depth, although interested readers are asked to consult my recent paper. For now, it is sufficient to note that for Nye, soft power is the power of attractive ideas to persuade individuals or groups to act in a certain way, in pursuit of identifiable goals. Soft power can be conceptually contrasted with the notion of ‘hard power’, that is military or economic influence, involving overt leverage and/or coercion.

Transnational ideas, both religious and secular, emerge and develop in response to changing international circumstances. For example, since World War II, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racism, national self-determination, and environmentalism have all been encouraged by creation and development of transnational networks. Such ideas represent soft power in international relations because they appeal to large numbers of people around the world who, by virtue of their collective effort, may seek to influence outcomes in the directions they would like to see. Success or failure does not necessarily depend on their ability to link up with state power. As Thomas puts it: ‘Transnational actors represent – or are seen to represent by individuals and groups in the international community – ideas whose time has come, ideas which increasingly shape the values and norms of the international system’. In sum, transnational ideas – both religious and secular – can help set and mould international agendas. They do this by adding to the lexicon and vocabulary of debate; and in some cases they are a source of soft power in international relations, informing the ideas and development of transnational civil society.

American Evangelical Protestants and international order

During the Clinton and (George W.) Bush presidencies, US-based Evangelical Protestants (henceforward, ‘evangelicals’) managed to translate their religiously-grounded support for certain international human rights causes, regarded as a key component of a better international order, into a more generic humanitarian language that non-evangelicals – even non-religious people more generally – could also support.

Attempts to translate moral and/or religious values into US foreign policy is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, as Table 1 indicates, religion has had a strong and continuous influence on US foreign policy over a long period.
Table 1: Religion and Foreign Policy in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Adversary</th>
<th>Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-revolutionary colonial America (1600-1776)</td>
<td>Millennium</td>
<td>‘Papal antichrist’</td>
<td>Example as ‘city on a hill’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary and founding era ((1776-1815)</td>
<td>Empire of liberty</td>
<td>Old world tyranny, ‘hellish fiends’ ((Native Americans</td>
<td>Example, continental expansion, without entangling alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manifest Destiny ((1815-1848)</td>
<td>Christian civilisation</td>
<td>Savages’ or ‘children’ (Native Americans</td>
<td>Example, continental expansion, without entangling alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial America ((1898-1913)</td>
<td>Christian civilisation</td>
<td>Barbarians’ and ‘savages’ ((Filipinos</td>
<td>Overseas expansion, without entangling alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilsonian Internationalism ((1914-1919)</td>
<td>Global democracy</td>
<td>Autocracy and imperialism</td>
<td>International organisations and alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War liberalism ((1946-1989)</td>
<td>Free world</td>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>International organisations and alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush and neo-conservatism ((2001-2009)</td>
<td>Spread of religious freedom and human rights</td>
<td>International terrorism, often linked to extremist Islam; totalitarian states, such as North Korea</td>
<td>Unilateral action with ad hoc alliances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The contemporary prominence of evangelicals in the US has its roots in the late 1970s when evangelicalism began a political resurgence, seeking to pressurise the US government to change policy in relation to certain domestic issues, all of which were concerned with moral issues such as abortion, family values, and school curricula. As Dan Wessner argued in 2003, from the movement’s origin until the present day evangelicals have ‘politicied to take back the Supreme Court, the Congress, the public schools, textbook publishing houses, foreign affairs, and the Executive branch. … [T]heir crusade is as evident as anywhere in the words and deeds of the current Bush Administration’. Note that Wessner is not referring solely to domestic issues; he also points out that evangelicals seek to influence foreign policy.

Expansion of the agenda beyond domestic culture-wars issues to international affairs was encouraged by the accession to power of George W. Bush who, many evangelicals believed, was a suitable individual to champion their preferred values in foreign policy. But the broadening of evangelicals’ global horizons was established prior to the Bush administration, during the Clinton presidencies (1993-2001). Indeed, as Alan Hertzke details in his important book, *Freening God’s Children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights*, from the mid-1990s evangelicals were the most important part of a new human rights movement in the USA. This movement helped create a new architecture for human rights monitoring and advocacy in American foreign policy. The ‘unlikely alliance’ in Hertzke’s subtitle refers to the fact that this movement comprised strange bedfellows. To maximise influence it was essential to develop broad alliances with diverse religious groups (e.g. the Jewish community and mainline Christian organisations) and with secular entities (e.g. student bodies on college campuses and traditional secular human rights organisations). The willingness to build coalitions reflects a significant change in the activism of conservative evangelicals.

By usual social movement standards, the evangelical-led movement to put various human rights issues on the foreign policy agenda had remarkable influence in a remarkably short time. Some of the highlights include:

- The International Religious Freedom Act (1998): By establishing an office and an annual international religious freedom report that grades countries on their religious rights, this law made freedom of religion and conscience a core objective of U.S. foreign policy. It was lobbied for by ‘a coalition of conservative Christians, Jews, Catholics, mainline Protestants, Tibetan Buddhists and others’.

- The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000): The aim was to remove international crime syndicates that dispatch children and women from the developing world into prostitution and sweatshops.

- The Sudan Peace Act (2002): Evangelicals promoted this law, outraged by the Sudanese government’s attacks on southern Sudanese Christians and animists. The law and its accompanying sanctions were influential in helping create the road map for Sudan’s 2003 ceasefire and the peace treaty in 2004.

- The North Korea Human Rights Act (2004): Evangelicals and Korean Americans lobbied for this bill. The aim was not only to focus U.S. attempts to help North Korean defectors,
but also to focus attention on the country’s egregious human rights violations and nuclear weapons programme.

These kinds of causes do not conform to evangelical culture-war stereotypes, and the diverse coalition partners that evangelicals have worked with on these issues is testament to the fact that what is going on here is more than just conventional interest group politics salient only to narrow segments of the population. Furthermore, it is important to reiterate that this movement did not emerge only as a partisan echo chamber for the moralistic foreign policy rhetoric used by the George W. Bush administration. In fact, the movement developed first during the Clinton administration and persisted during the George W. Bush administration—sometimes as its ally but sometimes as a critic.

The root of evangelicals’ persuasiveness is found in a commonplace but crucial fact: Unlike all other Western countries, the US is a highly religious nation. And, because in the US religion plays an important role in political life, there exists ‘greater prominence of religious organizations in society and politics’. Religious organisations are not mere run-of-the-mill lobby groups, nor are they necessarily monolithic in views, beliefs, and expectations. Moreover, while the tangible resources of religious interest groups pales in comparison to corporate lobbies, religion can often wield indirect influence that can be instrumental in helping construct the mindset of policymakers, including in relation to international human rights in US foreign policy, with subsequent impacts on international order. During the presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977–1981), himself a committed evangelical believer, a progressive version of evangelical politics became influential as it shared with Carter a focus on human rights and Christian humanitarian values. For some, however, Carter’s presidency was notable for a rising tide of pacifist sentiment that not only permeated American critical consciousness at the general level but also the upper levels of the Carter administration. By contrast, Ronald Reagan shared many of conservative evangelicalism’s ideals and goals, and encouraged it to develop into a significant lobby group. Then during the Clinton era the pendulum swung back toward left-leaning religious activists, who again enjoyed easy access to top administration officials. After George W. Bush’s election in 2001, conservative evangelical leaders were once again able to play the part of White House insiders, putting their stamp on administration priorities, including in the area of foreign policy—a shift Howard LaFranchi refers to as the ‘evangelization’ of US foreign policy.

A key issue which informed evangelicals’ involvement in foreign policy during the Clinton and especially George W. Bush administrations was a strong belief that the US was involved in a continuing international struggle between good and evil, with attendant conceptions of international order. While in the 1980s this struggle was defined by the secular struggle encapsulated by the Cold War between the USA and Soviet Union, from the mid-1990s evangelical concern focused centrally on various international human rights issues—including religious freedom (especially, protection of victims of sex and sweatshops trafficking), repression of non-Muslims in Sudan and more generally in the Arab/Muslim world, and the government of North Korea’s egregious suppression of its citizens’ civil liberties, including in relation to religious freedoms.

Religio-Moral Persuasion during the Clinton Administration

The Cold War came to an unexpected end in the late 1980s. At the time, foreign policy issues were not high up the list of priorities of most leaders in the evangelical movement. However, a series of events in the mid-1990s brought foreign policy issues to the fore. In 1995, Michael
Horowitz, a neo-conservative scholar at the Hudson Institute who had earlier been a general counsel in the Office of Management and Budget during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, wrote an opinion piece for the *Wall Street Journal*, entitled: ‘New Intolerance between the Crescent and the Cross’. Horowitz described what he saw as American indifference to religious persecution of Christians in several non-Christian parts of the world, many Muslim countries.

The article helped galvanise a sustained and coordinated evangelical response to Christian persecution around the world, encouraging America’s largest evangelical organisation—the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE)—to adopt in 1996 a Statement of Conscience expressing grave indignation at religious persecution around the world. This in turn led to sustained evangelical pressure on the Clinton administration to place more emphasis than hitherto on the issue of religious persecution around the world. Two people—Elliot Abrams (a lawyer who served in foreign policy positions for both Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush), and Nina Shea (Director of the Centre for Religious Freedom, based at the Hudson Institute)—were particularly influential in persuading the initially sceptical Clinton government to adopt the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). IRFA stipulated the creation, on the one hand, of an Ambassador-at-large for religious freedom and, on the other, required compulsory disciplinary procedures for governments of countries that were deemed to be seriously repressing free religious expression. Several US human rights groups strongly supported the Act, partly as a result of the contemporaneous egregious events in the Balkans (i.e. ethnic cleansing, especially of Muslims, in Bosnia), which the US government appeared to be tolerating. Business interests, on the other hand, regarded IRFA as a threat because it created the possibility of sanctions against important trading partners, including China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Partly as a result of their lobbying, IRFA was eventually moderated to safeguard business relationships with ‘problematic’ countries. In sum, ratification of IRFA clearly signified the determination of an initially sceptical Clinton administration to support human rights concerns, notably religious persecution, as a key area of US foreign policy.

Two years later, in 2000, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) was passed—almost without demur—by both houses of Congress, and signed into law by the president on the 28 October. TVPA sought to address a growing global human rights concern: international crime syndicates collecting and disseminating children and women from the developing world into both prostitution and sweatshops. Once again, Michael Horowitz was a driving force in getting the Act on to the statute book. Various human rights groups, joined by several feminist organisations, added their support, demonstrating the growing power of a new human rights coalition, involving both evangelicals and secular groups. With the help of Senator Paul Wellstone, the advocates of this cause were instrumental in persuading the Clinton administration to expand the Act to include *all* forms of trafficking, not ‘just’ sex trafficking. TVPA linked U.S. aid to efforts to crack down on trafficking in humans, and was widely seen as a good piece of legislation by groups that promote social justice. The Act was the conclusion of the U.S. government’s efforts, focused in the Trafficking in Persons and Worker Exploitation Task Force, an interagency group that brought together the FBI, Department of Labor, and other agencies to remedy a problem with both domestic and global dimensions.

As Gretchen Soderlund has argued, the TVPA was illustrative of how, pre-9/11, both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations sought to use abolitionist legal frameworks to stimulate international regime change, with an overall but implicit concern with building
better international order. In this context, combating international traffic in women and children became a common denominator political issue, uniting individuals and groups across political and religious spectrums. The point can be made more widely in relation to international human rights legislation enacted in the US during both administrations, which involved creation, development and consolidation of a broad-based coalition of religious and non-religious activists in pursuit of various human rights improvements around the world.

Religio-Moral Persuasion during the Bush Administration

We have noted that the evangelical lobby encountered an initially sceptical Clinton White House. Things changed with the accession to power of George W. Bush in January 2001. President Bush wore his religious credentials on his sleeve. For Bush, the country’s commitment to Christian values explicitly generates moral courage and character. Such claims provide a clear religious focus in current US foreign policy that sought to establish ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ in various countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan. The overall – yet implicit – aim was to improve international order through increasing numbers of democratic countries, following US encouragement. While Bush did not necessarily privilege religious over secular values, it is plausible to suggest that the religio-moral persuasion of conservative evangelicals—sometimes in tandem with other religious, as well as secular, entities – significantly influenced US foreign policy, especially in relation to human rights issues.

As Adam Wolfe notes, the ‘election of a president with established ties to evangelical leaders, who was comfortable quoting from the Bible in foreign policy speeches, allowed for an open dialogue on the issues of concern for advocates of the evangelical mission abroad’. At this time, two international human rights issues attracted particular attention of both evangelicals and non-evangelicals: (1) slavery and persecution of non-Muslims in Sudan, and (2) the government of North Korea’s egregious civil liberties violations.

During the George W. Bush presidency, evangelical Christians were able to strengthen their influence within the government. The NAE was particularly influential; in October 2004 it drew up a framework for political action, entitled ‘For the Health of the Nation: An Evangelical Call to Civic Responsibility’. The foreign policy sections of the document strongly endorsed abolition of sex trafficking and, more generally, protection of religious freedoms and other human rights.

These concerns were highlighted in the 2002 Sudan Peace Act (SPA), which came about through the efforts of a coalition of evangelical and human rights groups. The background to the SPA was that the northern-based National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Khartoum was violating human rights in numerous ways, including enslavement of women and children in the non-Arab south of Sudan; ethnic cleansing, mainly in the same part of the country; destruction of churches and schools in the South; and prevention of food aid from reaching animists and Christians in the South, in the context of a conflict with NIF forces.

This drew the attention of both evangelical and non-evangelical groups in pursuit of justice. Nonetheless, it took years of coordinated pressure to move the Congress and White House. An extraordinary coalition emerged in pursuit of legislation, grouping together numerous black churches, mainly white evangelicals, Chuck Colson’s Prison Fellowship, the Hudson Institute, Freedom House, the Institute on Religion and Democracy, the Congressional Black Caucus, the Boston-based American Anti-Slavery Group, and resolute civil rights leaders.
such as Joe Madison (activist radio talk show host) and Walter Fauntroy (Pastor of the New Bethel Baptist Church in Washington, D.C).

There were however opponents of the Act, notably US business interests, that aligned themselves with the NIF government because of newly discovered oil fields in Sudan. For these business interests, the NIF government was seen to represent the strongest and most stable available administration, able and willing to provide the best protection to foreign investment in the oil fields. Evangelical Christians, on the other hand, strongly supported in the South the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), mainly because the SPLM/A was believed to be protecting both Christians and animists from religious prosecution from the NIF government in Khartoum.

Following the success of the SPA, a similar coalition of evangelical and non-evangelical organisations focused upon another example of troubling human rights violations, this time involving the government of North Korea. After intense negotiations, the Senate unanimously passed the North Korea Human Rights Act (NKHRA) in 2004. The Act provided financial support to U.S. non-governmental groups aiding North Koreans; demanded that the United Nations (UN) confront China regarding its policy of repatriating North Korean refugees (a violation of a UN convention which the government of China had signed); called for the president to assign a special envoy for North Korean human rights; and made human rights a central issue in future US negotiations with North Korea’s government.

Several senators, including Evan Bayh, Sam Brownback, and Richard Lugar, were instrumental in guiding the bill’s passage. They were supported by an interfaith coalition led by evangelical Christians, within which the NAE was particularly active. This reflected the fact that the NAE had long “been at the forefront of efforts to bring greater religious freedom and respect for human rights to North Korea”. The issue of human rights violations in North Korea was further highlighted when, on 20 July 2006, the NAE joined with other religious and human rights organisations in outlining what was called a ‘Third Way’ for US negotiations with North Korea. This was put forward in an 18-point document entitled ‘Helsinki Approach to North Korea Policy Principles and Recommendations’. It emphasised a joint human rights and humanitarian approach rather than what its signatories saw as the Bush Administration’s dogged focus on arms control alone. The statement also gave its support to Senator Scoop Jackson’s ‘Let My People Go Act’ of 2006, which sought to curtail a designated list of Chinese exports to the US if China did not live up to international legal obligations regarding North Korean refugees.

The issue of North Korea was not restricted to human rights concerns, but was also linked to other concerns, notably humanitarian assistance for the country’s starving people and the government’s nuclear programme. At the level of policymaking, there was no consensus about whether to link the issue of human rights to other areas of concern, including the nuclear crisis and humanitarian aid. In Congress, on the other hand, there were attempts to consolidate existing legislation, with the issue of human rights part of a wider strategy of ‘regime change’ that more generally targeted the world’s remaining dictatorships. At the level of nongovernmental organisations, the evangelical movement worked with non-religious human rights activists in pursuit of religious and civil freedoms. As Richard Cizik, vice president for governmental affairs at the NAE and a signatory of the ‘Helsinki Approach,’ put it: The coalition was ‘going to be stronger than ever and we don’t intend to lose. This is a major movement …. We have a left-right coalition that bar none will move Washington, and it’s got China in the headlights.”
Conclusion

The evangelicals’ focus on human rights during the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies dovetailed well with a long-term governmental goal: to construct and embed an international order reflective of US norms and values, including, most importantly, democracy and enhanced religious freedoms, especially in the Arab/Muslim world. This is not to suggest that the evangelicals were cynically used by the administration in pursuit of these goals. Instead, we saw that an open political system like that of the USA can facilitate the achievement of goals when pursued by a well-organised and well-connected social movement. The evangelicals helped mould foreign policy preferences during both the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies (1993-2009). They did this by facilitating the spread of their values and goals in relation to various human rights concerns that dovetailed well with successive US administrations’ conceptions of a desirable international order.

Al-Qaeda and international order

For al-Qaeda, the aim of 9/11 was not simply to wreak terrible destruction but also to create a global media spectacle, a spectacular advertisement for the organisation and its militant ideological goals; its goals, it wished to announce, was to transform international order by any means necessary, including random terrorist violence. The mass of ‘downtrodden ordinary Sunni Muslims’ was the key target audience for the highly visual spectacle of the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.

Al-Qaeda used 9/11 especially to grab the attention of such people, inviting them to make connections between the attacks on the United States itself and the multiple resentments many such people already felt against America throughout the Muslim world, reflective of a US-dominated international order. Proximate reasons for Muslim antipathy included apparently unquestioning US support for Israel and unrepresentative rulers in the Arab world and American-led invasions of Iraq in 1990–91 and 2003, and Afghanistan in 2001. Taken together, as they often are, these issues indicate a deep degree of hatred of the United States in many parts of the Muslim world, antipathy not necessarily restricted to small numbers of religious or political radicals.

Apart from killing Americans and their allies, al-Qaeda has four other, related goals, which collectively have clear international order implications:

- Return to a ‘pure and authentic’ Islam as practised by the Prophet Mohammed and his companions in seventh century Medina, in order to bring back glory and prominence to Muslims.
- Overthrow regimes Al-Qaeda deems to be ‘non-Islamic’.
- Expel Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries – particularly the holy land of Saudi Arabia, because the West is said to have subjugated the lands of Islam, and Western individualistic values have corrupted Muslims
- Establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with a network of like-minded Islamic militant organisations.

During the 1990s, Al-Qaeda expanded its capacity and network, building links with various Islamist groups, including Egypt’s Islamic Jihad, whose leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, became bin Laden’s deputy in 1998. Other Islamist groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda include the Islamic
Jihad Movement (Eritrea), al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (Somalia), al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt),
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (Pakistan). Following
expulsion from Afghanistan in late 2001, al-Qaeda dispersed into small, often autonomous
groups in various parts of the world, a network of Sunni Islamic extremists. Al-Qaeda has
also developed money-making front businesses, solicited donations from like-minded
supporters, especially in Saudi Arabia, and illicitly siphoned funds from donations to Muslim
charitable organisations, including Islamic NGOs. 34

**Key Tenets of Al-Qaeda’s Ideology**

Al-Qaeda’s members and sympathisers are united in a belief that they are involved in a three-
pronged jihad (holy war) against ‘apostate’ Muslims, un-Islamic rulers and the West. The
organisation’s ideology draws on two key sources: Wahhabism – a version of the official
version of Islam found in Saudi Arabia – and the ideas of an Egyptian, Sayyid Qutb. Al-
Qaeda’s chief ideologue is bin Laden’s deputy, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The roots of Wahhabism, a puritanical interpretation of Islam, are found in the ideas of
Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an eighteenth-century Sunni reformer born in Arabia. He
believed that Islam had been corrupted more than a thousand years earlier, shortly after the
death of the Prophet Mohammed. Al-Wahhab denounced any theology – including religious
scholarship – and customs that had since developed as non-Islamic. In a religious revolution,
he and his supporters took over what is now Saudi Arabia, where his ideology (Wahhabism)
is still the dominant school of religio-political thought. Wahhabism has two central tenets: it
(1) preaches against worship of ‘false idols’, including the mystical form of Islam known as
Sufism – because Sufis worship local saints as well as God; and (2) regards Shias, Muslims
who revere the descendants of Ali, the Prophet Mohammed’s son-in-law, as apostates.
Wahhabism dynamically emerged from the Arabian peninsula 200 years ago, taking root
among Sunni Muslims in many parts of the Middle East and elsewhere.

The second key religious and ideological thinker informing Al-Qaeda’s ideology is Sayyid
Qutb (1906–1966). Qutb was an Egyptian, a prominent Islamist and member of the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Arab world’s oldest Islamist group, which advocates an Islamic state in
Egypt. His thought was deeply influenced by the revolutionary radicalism of a
contemporaneous Indian Islamist, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (1903–1979). Qutb’s
ideological development fell into two distinct periods: before 1954, and from 1954 until his
execution by the Egyptian government in 1966, following imprisonment and torture by the
secularist government of Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Following an attempt on Nasser’s life in
October 1954, the government imprisoned thousands of members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, including Qutb, and officially banned the organisation. During his second,
radical phase, Qutb declared ‘Western civilisation’ the enemy of Islam; denounced leaders of
Muslim nations for not following Islam closely enough; and sought to spread the belief
among Sunni Muslims that it was their duty to undertake jihad to defend and purify Islam.

Bin Laden’s deputy, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, is al-Qaeda’s chief ideologue. He was the man
most responsible for turning al-Qaeda into an international network, following the merger
between his organisation, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda in 1998. According to
Montasser el-Zayat, a prominent Egyptian attorney who defends Islamic radicals and spent
three years in prison with al-Zawahiri from 1981 for conspiracy to assassinate the late
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, ‘he is bin Laden’s brain … the planner, the organiser and
the thinker who laid the ground for the idea of an Islamic front’. 35 Al-Zawahiri is also a key
figure in promoting the use of suicide attacks. He claimed in an interview in 2002 that ‘It is the love of death in the path of Allah, that is the weapon that will annihilate this evil empire of America’.  

Following the failure of attempted Islamist initiatives in the Arab Middle East – for example, in Algeria and Saudi Arabia – al-Zawahiri believed that tactical changes were necessary in order to achieve success. He is thought to have personally persuaded bin Laden to refocus Al-Qaeda’s attention towards the United States – and the West more generally – and to stop trying to spread revolution in the Muslim world. To this end, al-Zawahiri was the second of five signatories – bin Laden was the first – to the 1998 fatwa declaring ‘jihad against Jews and Crusaders’ and which ‘authorised’ the killing of Americans. This was a pivotal moment in the development of Al-Qaeda’s ideology as it gave a concrete set of goals in relation to contemporary issues which could be justified and pursued by reference to the organisation’s ideological referents: Wahhabism and the ideas of Sayyid Qutb.

In sum, al-Qaeda’s militant ideology underpinned resistance to what its leaders see as the dictates of a US-led, secular and inherently corrupting, international order. For al-Qaeda leaders this is emblematic of a wider, corrosive social and economic dislocation – most notable in Palestine’s occupied territories, Iraq and Afghanistan – that undermines stability and cohesiveness of local Sunni Muslim cultures. Followers of Al-Qaeda are urged to deal with attempts to impose US-led international order by recourse to traditional patterns of behaviour rooted in their Islamic heritage. There is also the context provided by the fact that, in the Sunni Muslim world, especially among the Arab countries, Muslim traditions have for decades generally been denied or at best downplayed. This was the result of policies of various kinds of secular and secularising regimes that filled the Muslim world after World War II. That these countries had rulers widely believed to be ‘in the pockets’ of Western governments, especially that of the USA, while often disappointing the developmental and political expectations of their populations, was regarded as proof of a more fundamental, holistic denial of Islam as a self-contained religious, social, political and economic system and of capitulation to the dictates of a US-led international order.

Al-Qaeda, Orientalism and the ‘Clash of Civilisations’

It is useful briefly to examine the development of al-Qaeda’s view of international order in relation to two theses: Edward Said’s Orientalism and Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’. This will enable us to locate al-Qaeda’s conception of a desirable international order in the context of what its supporters see as long-term, historically rooted, Western cultural, political and economic domination, involving rejection of key ‘Western’ values that underpin associated conceptions of international order: pluralism, liberal democracy, relativism and radical individualism.

The idea of Islam as a body of religious and social thought that is inherently atavistic and at odds with Western conceptions of thought, culture and order is captured by Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism. Said defined Orientalism as a ‘style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) the “Occident”’. 37 He claimed that many Western politicians and academics ‘essentialised’ both Muslims and Islam into unchanging categories, but that many of these assumptions were little more than generalisations with little or no foundation. Said cited Lord Cromer, the British governor of Egypt between 1882 and 1907, who argued that ‘the Oriental generally acts, speaks and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European’. While Cromer claimed
that ‘the European’ is a ‘close reasoner’ and a ‘natural logician’, he believed ‘the Oriental’ to be ‘singularly deficient in the logical faculty’. 38 Although Cromer was no doubt a product of his times, there is no obvious reason to believe that his prejudiced views are entirely extinct.

A recent example of what might be called **nouveau** Orientalism is to be found in Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. 39 Given that 9/11 and many subsequent terrorist outrages were undertaken by militant Muslims against western targets, then the question can be asked whether these events mark the beginning of Huntington’s mooted ‘civilisational’ conflict between Islam and the West. It is plausible that 9/11 and subsequent US responses have made Huntington’s prophecies about clashing civilisations appear far less abstract and far more plausible than when first articulated over 15 years ago.

Huntington’s main argument is that, following the end of the Cold War, a new, global clash was under way, replacing the four-decades-long conflict between liberal democracy/capitalism and communism, a new fight between the (Christian) ‘West’ and the (mostly Muslim, mostly Arab) ‘East’. The core of Huntington’s argument was that after the Cold War the ‘Christian’, democratic West particularly found itself in conflict with radical Islam, a key threat to international order. Christianity, on the other hand, was thought conducive not only to the spread of liberal democracy but also more generally to pro-Western international order. In evidence, he noted the collapse of dictatorships in southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the development of liberal democratic political norms (rule of law, free elections, civil rights) and the consequent acceptance of international order norms and values. These events were regarded by Huntington as conclusive proof of the synergy between Christianity and liberal democracy, collectively foundations of a normatively desirable international global order reflecting Western-style liberal values.

Critics of Huntington’s argument note that it is one thing to argue that various brands of political Islam have qualitatively different perspectives on liberal democracy and perhaps international order compared to some forms of Christianity, but quite another to claim that Muslims *en masse* are poised to enter into a period of conflict with the West, in an attempt to redraw the parameters and content of international order.

Second, the 9/11 atrocities and subsequent bomb outrages do not appear to have been carried out by a state or group of states or at their behest, but by al-Qaeda acting without state support. Despite energetic US attempts, no proof was found to link the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq with Al-Qaeda.

Third, the idea of religious or civilisational conflict is problematic because it is actually very difficult to identify clear territorial boundaries to civilisations, and even more difficult to perceive them as acting as coherent units. Huntington’s image of ‘clashing civilisations’ appears to focus too closely on an essentially undifferentiated category – ‘civilisation’ – and place insufficient emphasis on various trends, conflicts and disagreements that take place within *all* cultural traditions, whether Islam, Christianity, Judaism or whatever. The wider point is that cultures are not usefully seen as closed systems of essentialist values, *à la* Orientalism. It is actually implausible to understand the world as comprising a strictly limited number of cultures, each with their own unique core sets of beliefs.

Finally, the image of ‘clashing civilisations’ ignores the fact that al-Qaeda’s terrorism is aimed not only at the United States and the West more generally: it also targets
unrepresentative, corrupt and illegitimate – in short, ‘un-Islamic’ – governments in the Arab/Muslim world. Since the 1970s, the general rise of Islamist groups – including al-Qaeda – can be seen as a consequence of the political and economic failures of such governments, supported by successive US administrations, rather than the result only of bin Laden’s influence.

Taken together, the arguments of Said and Huntington underline that there is a deep-rooted tradition in Western thought that sees the the Muslim world (the ‘Orient’) as both distinct and distinctive compared to the ‘Christian’ West. During the centuries of Western imperialism, frequent debates focused on what rights non-Christian and non-European peoples should enjoy. In the centuries of competition and sometimes conflict between Christianity and Islam, the notion of ‘holy war’ emerged – that is, a special kind of conflict undertaken effectively outside any framework of shared rules and norms – and ‘just war’, carried out for the vindication of rights within a shared framework of values. There is also a further strand of Western thought that contends that, because of their nature, some types of states and ideological systems cannot realistically be dealt with on ‘normal’ terms, that is, accepted rules that govern international relations have to be set aside when dealing with them. For example, during 1980s the Reagan administration in the United States averred that there was a basic lack of give-and-take available when dealing with communist governments, which meant that it was appropriate that some basic notions of international law could be set aside in such contexts.

Like certain traditions of Western thought, some aspects of al-Qaeda’s conception of international order also have universal themes, for example, the focus on injustice and inequality. But when we ask: ‘What do al-Qaeda bombers and cadres hope to achieve?’ we may be trying to apply a Western concept, underpinned by the implicit assumption that they are trying to achieve certain finite goals.

However, the question can be posed differently: ‘Why do al-Qaeda bombers believe that they must act as they do, for example, killing people apparently randomly in bomb attacks?’ The answer is that they may well literally believe that they have no other rational choice – if they are going to defend their religion and culture against attempts to impose a US-led international order. Such a presumption is underpinned by the timbre of militant statements from some captured al-Qaeda terrorists that emphasise both the general and the specific. For example, Imam Samudra, the Bali bomber, perceived what he saw as a specific abomination – Bali’s Western-orientated night clubs – as an integral aspect of a more general Western-directed order which undermined the existential positions of all Muslims. This mix of specific and general concerns is a more general component of Islamic militant ideology and beliefs wherever ‘Muslim terrorism’ is carried out or threatened: from Kashmir to Chechnya to Kenya and Somalia. For example, the day following a 1998 al-Qaeda bombing in Nairobi that killed over 200 people, the Islamic Liberation Army of the People of Kenya, an al-Qaeda cover organisation, issued a communiqué that included reference to both specifically Kenyan and more general concerns:

The Americans humiliate our people, they occupy the Arabian peninsula, they extract our riches, they impose a blockade and, besides, they support the Jews of Israel, our worse enemies, who occupy the Al-Aqsa mosque … The attack was justified because the government of Kenya recognized that the Americans had used the country’s territory to fight against its Moslem neighbors, in particular Somalia. Besides, Kenya cooperated with Israel. In this country one finds the most anti-Islamic Jewish centers
in all East Africa. It is from Kenya that the Americans supported the separatist war in Southern Sudan, pursued by John Garang’s fighters. 40

Such a combination of the specific and the general have helped to spread Al-Qaeda’s ideological convictions throughout the Sunni Muslim world. Al-Qaeda cadres no doubt believe that they are front-line troops engaged in a battle for the survival of their society, culture, religion and way of life, undermined and attacked by aggressive US-led attempts to impose order. They may believe that they are fighting in self-defence in a last-ditch stand; and under such circumstances it is rational for them to justify the use of tactics – such as, apparently indiscriminate bombings – as acceptable during conditions of a no holds barred ‘holy war’.

However, it is ironic that al-Qaeda (‘the base’) no longer appears to have a physical base, following its expulsion from Afghanistan. Since 2001–2002, the scattering of al-Qaeda has weakened, but not destroyed, the organisation. Al-Qaeda has transformed itself into a collection of regional terror groups that operate more autonomously than before, collectively informed by shared ideological convictions that it is necessary to destroy US-led international order.

Conclusion

There is a further irony in that the war in Iraq – presented as an opportunity to do away with a brutal, obnoxious regime and spread Western values of order, democracy and religious freedom–actually provided Al-Qaeda with an excellent chance to exploit the resulting circumstances, both materially and ideologically. The US government’s claim was that Saddam’s Iraq was a place where terrorists gathered; it appears that it wasn’t then, but it certainly is now. George Tenet, then director of the CIA, stated in early 2004 that, ‘as we continue the battle against Al-Qaeda, we must overcome a movement – a global movement infected by Al-Qaeda’s radical agenda’. 41 The inference is that al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology is now attracting increased support, expanding its networks among a new generation of supporters not only in Iraq but also elsewhere in the Sunni Muslim world. I have argued that such people may be regarded as often idealists who believe in the concept of global jihad as necessary to liberate the lands of Islam from Western control. Al-Qaeda strategists may not have hoped to defeat or even to weaken ‘America’ militarily on 9/11, but to gain publicity, to reach out to further recruits; and this has been forthcoming. This amounts to a psychological victory, useful progress towards the achievement of Al-Qaeda’s goals: jihad against ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’; chase away the Americans from the holy land, Saudi Arabia; and establish the puritanical rule of Wahhabism throughout the Sunni Muslim world.

Several of these objectives have already been achieved. Some of President Bush’s responses to 9/11, especially the swift war in Afghanistan, were unavoidable given the state of public opinion after the attacks. However, the unfortunate crudeness and depth of response against what many Muslims now believe is an assault not only on Al-Qaeda but also on Islam itself, has done nothing either to defeat Al-Qaeda or stop the spread of its ideology. President Bush quickly declared a ‘crusade’ both against the specific threat of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and terrorism in general. He sent the US fleet back to the Middle East, undermined the Saudi royal family, and removed US troops from the country. This led to two counterproductive outcomes: much free publicity for bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, and the antagonism of many ordinary Muslims around the world because of various policies, including: ‘racial profiling’, draconian legislation, mass arrests, and detentions at Guantanamo Bay prison camp.
Overall Conclusion

Can evangelicals and non-evangelicals, including secular liberals, continue to work together meaningfully in pursuit of human rights goals in US foreign policy in the post-Bush era? This query was posed by a *New York Times* columnist, David Brooks, in a recent article. Brooks contended that America has a clear choice: a ‘culture war’ or ‘a war on poverty, but we can't have both’. 42 Liberals and conservatives could of course carry on attacking each other over their differing values, yet it is becoming increasingly clear that US public opinion wants the issue to be less centre stage than before, believing that the strengths of both should be harnessed and differences aside in order to help the disadvantaged at both home and abroad. Evidence from this paper suggests that the last decade has seen emergence, growth and now consolidation of an alliance between liberals and evangelical Christians in pursuit of shared goals that focus centrally on what they regard as fundamentals of a desirable domestic agenda and international order: anti-poverty and human rights both at home and overseas. Why? As Brooks notes, it is because these are the only two groups that are not only really concerned about these issues but are also willing to devote time and money to improving them via transnational initiatives. ‘If liberals and evangelicals don’t get together on antipoverty measures, then there will be no majority for them and they won't get done’. 43 It is noteworthy that David Brooks is not a liberal – but a noted conservative political commentator.

We have seen overall that a coalition of evangelicals and liberals developed in the USA since the mid-1990s, becoming increasingly influential in pursuit of human rights measures in US foreign policy. We also noted that it is not necessarily crucial for effective exercise of evangelical influence on foreign policy that policymakers must actually share evangelicals’ religious values. Evidence for this comes from the fact that both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush— men who would not necessarily be noted for sharing either religious or secular beliefs, despite the fact that both describe themselves as Christians—were equally responsive to evangelical-led campaigns for human rights. This also suggests that the evangelicals’ influence – especially if it continues to be linked to influential non-evangelical groups – will not necessarily come to an end – even with the anticipated ideological change in the White House during the Obama presidency.

This indicates in turn that a specifically ‘evangelical’ set of religio-moral values in foreign policy is not the key issue. Rather it is that evangelicals have since the early years of the Clinton presidency cannily married together their religious values with more general humanitarian values to form a convincing argument in relation to US human rights-oriented foreign policy and by extension wider concerns of international order. As a result, I envisage that, during the Obama presidency, religio-moral persuasiveness of human rights concerns will retain centrality in American foreign policy, as will the significance of the evangelical lobby on policymakers, including President Obama.

What of al-Qaeda in the new American order? We have noted that al-Qaeda is now as much an ideology or a set of values as a single organisation led by a single leader. It has evolved into a brand name or a franchise, ineluctably linked with the various and complex manifestations of modern Islamic militancy, including, Pakistan’s Laishkar-e-Taibar. The goal however, remains the same: to destroy the US-dominated international order.
Al-Qaeda’s perceptions are underpinned by specific factors, especially poor and declining existentialist conditions for many ordinary Muslims in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. (As I write this, the Gaza strip is emerging from three weeks of sustained Israeli bombardment.) Al-Qaeda works from the presumption that Islam is the perfect social system; this implies a further understanding: something or someone must be to blame for Muslims’ existential problems. The rhetorical question they ask is this: ‘Why are so many Muslim countries ruled by self-serving, corrupt and unrepresentative governments?’ Their answer is twofold: (1) Western governments – especially that of the United States – encourage them to do so, and (2) ordinary Muslims – whether passively or actively – encourage apostate rule by failing to practise religious duties with sufficient diligence. In this context, suicide bombs are a way to try: (1) seek to restore Muslim pride (2) weaken the power of the American ‘Crusaders’, and (3) facilitate the eventual return to the perhaps mythical ‘golden age’ of a millennium ago when Arab Muslim were leaders of huge empires. All three goals require fundamental changes to the extant international order.

What can Western governments do to redress the ideological appeal of Al-Qaeda, especially among the ‘wretched of the earth’ in the Muslim world? While the scale of the militants’ aims makes them very difficult to counter, there are practical policies that might help, such as, peace between Israel and the Palestinians, although even this unlikely event would almost certainly not end Islamic militancy quickly or completely; it would deny, however, deny militant Islamists a key piece of ‘evidence’. It might also help sincerely to pressurise repressive governments of Muslim countries to reform politically. However, the ultimate worry is not necessarily al-Qaeda per se but the numerous, rather diffuse militant Islamic organisations that now exist to a lesser or greater degree independently of Al-Qaeda, with the ability to acquire new supporters as a result of perceived local, national and international injustices.


Thomas, op. cit; Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, Basingstoke, UK. 3 Palgrave Macmillan, 2004


7 Haynes, ‘Transnational religious actors and international politics’, op. cit.


17 Ibid.


19 Shibley Telhami, ‘Between Faith and Ethics,’ in Bryan J. Hehir, Michael Walzer, Louise Richardson, Shibley Telhami, Charles Krauthammer, and James Lindsay, *Liberty and Power: A Dialogue on Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy in an*

21 Ibid.


35 Available at http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,6119,2-10-1462_1500844,00.html.


38 Ibid, p. 39


41 Available at [http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0226/p03s02-usfp.html](http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0226/p03s02-usfp.html)


43 Ibid.